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Explaining a Productive Decade
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE United States rose sharply in the mid-1990s,
after a quarter century of sluggish gains. That pickup was widely docu-
mented, and a relatively broad consensus emerged that the speedup in the
second half of the 1990s was importantly driven by information technology
(IT).
1 After 2000, however, the economic picture changed dramatically, with
a sharp pullback in IT investment, the collapse in the technology sector,
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 2001 recession. Given
the general belief that IT was a key factor in the growth resurgence in the
mid-1990s, many analysts expected that labor productivity growth would
slow as IT investment retreated after 2000. Instead labor productivity accel-
erated further over the next several years. More recently, however, the
pace of labor productivity growth has slowed considerably.
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1. See Economic Report of the President 2001, Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001),
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000, 2003), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh
(2002, 2005), and Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002). In these papers IT refers to computer hard-
ware, software, and communications equipment. This category often also is referred to as
information and communications technology, or ICT. For industry-level evidence support-
ing the role of IT in the productivity resurgence, see Stiroh (2002b). For an interpretation of
the industry evidence that puts less emphasis on IT, see Bosworth and Triplett (2007) and
McKinsey Global Institute (2001).
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been intensely interested in the course of productivity growth since 2000.
Distinguishing among the possible explanations for the continued strength
in productivity growth is challenging, because much of that strength appeared
in measured multifactor productivity (MFP), the unexplained residual in
the standard growth accounting setup. Nevertheless, potential explanations
can be divided into two broad categories: those centered on IT and those
unrelated or only loosely related to IT.
The simplest IT-centered story—that rapid technological progress in the
production of IT and the induced accumulation of IT capital raised produc-
tivity growth—does not work for the period after 2000, because the contri-
butions to growth from both the production and the use of IT declined. A
second IT-related story that has received a great deal of attention is that IT
investment proxies for complementary investments in intangible capital,
and a growing body of research has highlighted the important role played by
such intangibles.
2 A third IT-related story identiﬁes IT as a general-purpose
technology that spurs further innovation over time in a wide range of
industries, ultimately boosting growth in MFP.
3 Because this process takes
time, the gains in MFP observed since 2000 could reflect the follow-on
innovations from the heavy investment in IT in the second half of the 1990s.
Another broad set of explanations highlights forces not speciﬁc to IT.
Gains in labor productivity since 2000 could have been driven by funda-
mental technological progress outside of IT production, as implied by the
strong growth in MFP in other sectors.
4 Alternatively, the robust advance
in labor productivity could reflect broader macroeconomic factors such
as normal cyclical dynamics, a decline in adjustment costs after 2000 as
investment spending dropped back, greater-than-usual business caution
in hiring and investment, or increased competitive pressures on firms to
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2. See Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), Bresnahan,
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), Basu and others (2004), Black and Lynch (2001, 2004), and
Nakamura (1999, 2001, 2003). The National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) exclude
virtually all intangibles other than software, although the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
which produces the NIPA data, recently released a satellite account for scientiﬁc research
and development; see Okubo and others (2006).
3. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) were the ﬁrst to write about IT as a general-purpose
technology. See also Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2000),
Schreyer (2000), van Ark (2000), Basu and others (2004), and Basu and Fernald (2007).
4. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007); Bosworth and Triplett (2007).
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cost-cutting hypothesis, in particular, has received considerable attention
in the business press.
5
In this paper we try to sort out these issues using both aggregate and
industry-level data.
6 We investigate four speciﬁc questions. First, given the
latest data and some important extensions to the standard growth account-
ing framework, is an IT-centered story still the right explanation for the
resurgence in productivity growth over 1995–2000, and does IT play a
signiﬁcant role when considering the entire decade since 1995? Second,
what  accounts for the continued strength in productivity growth after
2000? Third, how has investment in intangible capital inﬂuenced produc-
tivity developments? Finally, what are the prospects for labor productivity
growth in coming years?
Our analysis relies in part on neoclassical growth accounting, a method-
ology that researchers and policymakers have used for many years to gain
insights into the sources of economic growth. Notably, the Council of
Economic Advisers, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Federal
Reserve Board routinely use growth accounting as part of their analytical
apparatus to assess growth trends.
7
Of course, growth accounting is subject to limitations, and in recent years
many analysts have leveled critiques at this methodology. For example,
the standard neoclassical framework does not explicitly account for adjust-
ment costs, variable factor utilization, deviations from perfect competition
and constant returns to scale, outsourcing and offshoring, management
expertise, or the intangibles that are omitted from published data. In addi-
tion, researchers have raised a host of measurement issues that could affect
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5. See Gordon (2003), Baily (2003), Schweitzer (2004), and Stiroh (forthcoming). For
references to the business press, see Gordon (2003) and Stiroh (forthcoming).
6. Several other researchers have examined industry data, including Baily and Lawrence
(2001), Stiroh (2002b), Nordhaus (2002b), Corrado and others (2007), and Bosworth and
Triplett (2007). For references to the literature on industry-level data in Europe, see van
Ark and Inklaar (2005).
7. See Economic Report of the President 2007, Congressional Budget Office (2007a,
2007b), and the latest available transcripts of the meetings of the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee (FOMC). The 2001 FOMC transcripts show that staff presentations on the
economic outlook featured growth accounting in the discussion of productivity trends.
Private sector analysts also rely on growth accounting; see, for example, Global Insight,
U.S. Executive Summary, March 2007, and Macroeconomic Advisers, Macro Focus,
March 22, 2007.
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with all of these critiques, but we augment the standard framework to
account for some of the most salient ones. In particular, we take on board
time-varying utilization of inputs, adjustment costs for capital, and intangi-
bles. Our intent is to broaden the standard framework to get a fuller view
of productivity developments during the past decade.
Brieﬂy, our answers to the four questions we pose are as follows. Both
the aggregate and the industry-level results indicate that IT was indeed a
key driver of the pickup in labor productivity growth over 1995–2000. IT
also is a substantial contributor to labor productivity growth over the full
decade since 1995, although its contribution is smaller after 2000. In the
aggregate data, this conclusion stands even after accounting for variable
factor utilization, adjustment costs, and intangible capital.
Regarding the continued strength in labor productivity growth since
2000 in the published data, our answer has a number of elements. As a
matter of growth accounting arithmetic, the smaller—although still sizable—
contribution of IT after 2000 was more than offset by several factors, the
most important being faster MFP growth outside the IT-producing sector.
Just as the aggregate data highlight different sources of productivity growth
during 1995–2000 than since 2000, so do the industry data. The industry
composition of labor productivity growth across these periods shifted sig-
niﬁcantly, and we report evidence that IT capital was linked to changes in
industry productivity growth in the 1990s but not in the period since 2000.
The industry data also suggest that the rapid post-2000 productivity
gains were due, at least in part, to restructuring and cost cutting in some
industries as highlighted by Robert Gordon.
9 In particular, those indus-
tries that saw the sharpest declines in profits from the late 1990s through
2001 also tended to post the largest gains in labor productivity in the early
2000s. Because these restructuring-induced advances probably were one-
84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
8. Much has been written about the link between management expertise and productivity,
including Bloom and Van Reenen (2006), McKinsey Global Institute (2001), and Farrell,
Baily, and Remes (2005). Gordon (2003) and Sichel (2003) provide reasons why offshoring
and hours mismeasurement may have had a relatively limited effect on labor productivity
growth, whereas Houseman (2007) argues that these factors could have had a signiﬁcant
effect in the U.S. manufacturing sector. For a discussion of measurement issues related to
the pace of technical progress in the semiconductor industry, see Aizcorbe, Oliner, and Sichel
(2006). For further discussion of issues related to critiques of the neoclassical framework,
see Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2007b).
9. Gordon (2003).
10657-02a_Oliner.qxd  8/15/07  10:12 AM  Page 84time events (and could be reversed), they are unlikely to be a source of
ongoing support to productivity growth.
In addition, the industry evidence indicates that reallocations of both
material and labor inputs have been important contributors to labor produc-
tivity growth since 2000, a point that Barry Bosworth and Jack Triplett
also note.
10 Although it is difﬁcult to pin a precise interpretation on the
reallocation results, the importance of these reallocations could be viewed as
evidence that the ﬂexibility of the U.S. economy has supported aggregate
productivity growth in recent years by facilitating the shifting of resources
among industries.
The incorporation of intangibles into the aggregate growth accounting
framework takes some of the luster off the performance of labor productivity
since 2000 and makes the gains in the 1995–2000 period look better than
they looked in the published data. In addition, the step-up after 2000 in MFP
growth outside the IT-producing sector is smaller after accounting for intan-
gibles than in the published data. Thus any stories tied to a pickup in MFP
growth (such as IT as a general-purpose technology) may apply to the entire
decade since 1995 and not simply to recent years. This framework also
implies that intangible investment has been quite sluggish since 2000, coin-
ciding with the soft path for IT capital spending. All else equal, this pattern
could be a negative for labor productivity growth in the future to the
extent that these investments are seed corn for future productivity gains.
Finally, our analysis of the prospects for labor productivity growth high-
lights the wide range of possible outcomes. We report updated estimates of
trend growth in labor productivity from a Kalman ﬁlter model developed
by John Roberts;
11 these results generate a 2-standard-error conﬁdence band
extending from 1
1⁄4 percent to 3
1⁄4 percent at an annual rate, with a point
estimate of 2
1⁄4 percent. In addition, we solve for the steady-state growth of
labor productivity in a multisector model under a range of conditioning
assumptions. This machinery also suggests a wide range of outcomes,
extending from about 1
1⁄2 percent to just above 3 percent, with a midpoint
of 2
1⁄4 percent. Notwithstanding the wide band of uncertainty, these esti-
mates are consistent with productivity growth remaining signiﬁcantly above
the pace that prevailed in the twenty-ﬁve years before 1995, but falling
short of the very rapid gains recorded over the past decade.
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10. Bosworth and Triplett (2007).
11. Roberts (2001).
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gate growth accounting framework and presents baseline results that account
for variable factor utilization and adjustment costs. The section that follows
uses the approach of Susanto Basu and coauthors to generate time series for
intangible investment and capital services and presents growth accounting
results for the augmented framework.
12 This approach complements that
in the 2005 and 2006 papers by Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, and Daniel
Sichel, who also developed time series of intangible investment and capital
and incorporated those estimates into a standard growth accounting frame-
work. We then turn to the industry data to supplement the insights that can
be drawn from the aggregate data. Finally, we discuss the outlook for pro-
ductivity growth and present some brief conclusions.
Aggregate Growth Accounting: Analytical Framework 
and Baseline Results
We use an extension of the growth accounting framework developed
by Oliner and Sichel to analyze the sources of aggregate productivity growth
in the United States.
13 That framework was designed to measure the growth
contributions from the production and use of IT capital, key factors that
emerged in the second half of the 1990s. The framework has some limita-
tions, however. It excludes intangible capital, which has received much
attention in recent research on the sources of productivity gains. It also
imposes the strict neoclassical assumption of a frictionless economy and thus
abstracts from cyclical inﬂuences on productivity growth and from the effects
of adjustment costs arising from the installation of new capital goods.
The growth accounting framework in this paper incorporates all of these
considerations. We meld the original Oliner-Sichel model with the treatment
of adjustment costs and cyclical factor utilization developed by Basu, John
Fernald, and Matthew Shapiro.
14 In addition, we take account of intangible
capital by drawing on the model of Basu, Fernald, Nicholas Oulton, and
Sylaja Srinivasan.
15
86 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
12. Basu and others (2004).
13. Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002).
14. Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001; hereafter BFS)
15. Basu and others (2004; hereafter BFOS).
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The model that underlies our analytical framework includes six sectors.
Four of these produce the final nonfarm business output included in the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs): computer hardware, soft-
ware, communications equipment, and a large non-IT-producing sector.
The NIPAs omit production of virtually all intangible capital other than
software. Our model accounts for this capital by adding a ﬁfth ﬁnal-output
sector that produces the intangible assets excluded from the NIPAs. In addi-
tion to the ﬁve ﬁnal-output sectors, our model includes a sector that pro-
duces semiconductors, which are either consumed as an intermediate input
by the ﬁnal-output sectors or exported to foreign ﬁrms. To focus on the role
of semiconductors in the economy, the model abstracts from all other inter-
mediate inputs.
Following BFS, we allow the length of the workweek, labor effort, and
the utilization of capital to vary over time. We also assume that the instal-
lation of new capital diverts resources from the production of market output.
As in BFS, these adjustment costs depend on the amount of investment
relative to existing capital. Boosting the ratio of investment to capital in-
creases the fraction of output that is lost to adjustment costs.
16 To complete
the model speciﬁcation, we assume that the production function in every
sector exhibits constant returns to scale and that the economy is perfectly
competitive.
17
Given this model, the appendix in the working paper version of this paper
shows that growth in aggregate labor productivity can be expressed as
18
where a dot over a variable signiﬁes the growth rate of that variable, V is
aggregate value added in nonfarm business, H is aggregate hours worked,
Kj is the aggregate amount of type-j capital used in the nonfarm business




L            ≡−= − () − () ++ ∑        αφ α     FP,
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16. Although BFS also include adjustment costs for labor in their model, they zero out
these costs in their empirical work. We simply omit labor adjustment costs from the start. For
additional discussion of capital adjustment costs and productivity growth, see Kiley (2001).
17. The results in BFS and in Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) strongly support the
assumption of constant returns for the economy as a whole. We invoke perfect competition
as a convenience in a model that already has many moving parts.
18. Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007).
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K are, respectively, the income shares for labor and each type
of capital, φj is the adjustment cost elasticity of output with respect to type-j
capital, q is an index of labor quality, and MFP denotes multifactor pro-
ductivity. The various types of capital include computer hardware, software,
communications equipment, other tangible capital, and intangible capital
other than software; each type of capital is produced by the corresponding
final-output sector in our model. Except for the adjustment cost effect
captured by φj, equation 1 is a standard growth decomposition. It expresses
growth in labor productivity as the sum of the contribution from the increase
in capital per hour worked (capital deepening), the contribution from the
improvement in labor quality, and growth in aggregate MFP.
19
Aggregate MFP growth, in turn, equals a share-weighted sum of the
sectoral MFP growth rates:
where S denotes the semiconductor sector and i indexes the ﬁnal-output sec-
tors in our model (listed above). The weight for each sector equals its gross
output divided by aggregate value added. These are the usual Domar weights
that take account of the input-output relationships among industries.
20
Equation 2 has the same structure as its counterpart in an earlier paper by
Oliner and Sichel.
21 The only formal difference is that including intangible
capital increases the number of ﬁnal-output sectors from four to ﬁve.
22
() , 2 MFP MFP MFP ii
i
SS      =+ ∑μμ     
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represents the output elasticity of type-j capital. In the case
without adjustment costs, φj = 0, and so the income share αj
K proxies for this output elasticity.
However, in the presence of adjustment costs, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice
of capital yields the more general result shown in equation 1. In effect, the income share
captures both the direct contribution of capital to production and the beneﬁt of having an
extra unit of capital to absorb adjustment costs. The weight in equation 1 nets out the por-
tion of the income share that relates to adjustment costs, as this effect is embedded in the
MFP term discussed below.
20. Domar (1961).
21. Oliner and Sichel (2002).
22. In contrast to the expression for aggregate MFP growth in BFS, equation 2 contains no
terms to account for reallocations of output, labor, or capital across sectors. The particularly
clean form of equation 2 arises, in large part, from our assumption of constant returns to scale
and the absence of adjustment costs for labor (which implies that competitive forces equate the
marginal product of labor in all sectors). In addition, we have assumed that any wedge between
the shadow value of capital and its user cost owing to adjustment costs is the same in all sectors.
Given this assumption, reallocations of capital across sectors do not affect aggregate output.
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for the ﬁnal-output sectors and
for semiconductor producers, where the ξ’s represent the elasticity of sectoral
output with respect to the workweek (W), the I’s and K’s denote sectoral
investment and capital services for each type of capital, the φ’s represent
the sectoral adjustment cost elasticities for each type of capital, and the
z’s represent the true level of technology. All of the ξ’s and φ’s take pos-
itive values.
In the BFS model that we adopt, ﬁrms vary the intensity of their factor use
along all margins simultaneously, which makes the workweek a sufﬁcient
statistic for factor utilization in general. Lengthening the workweek boosts
measured MFP growth in equations 3 and 4 as ﬁrms obtain more output
from their capital and labor. Regarding adjustment costs, faster growth of
investment spending relative to that of capital depresses measured MFP
growth as ﬁrms divert resources from producing market output to in-
stalling new plant and equipment. The effects of factor utilization and
adjustment costs drive a wedge between measured MFP growth and the
true pace of improvement in technology z ..
Data, Calibration, and Measurement Issues
This section provides a brief overview of the data used for our aggre-
gate growth accounting, discusses the calibration of key parameters, and
addresses some important measurement issues.23 The national accounts
data that we discuss here exclude virtually all forms of intangible capital
except for investment in computer software. We defer the consideration of
intangible capital until the next section.
Our dataset represents an up-to-date reading on productivity develop-
ments through 2006 based on data available as of the end of March 2007.
We rely heavily on the dataset assembled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) for its estimates of MFP in the private nonfarm business sector. This
() ,, , 4 MFP W I K z SS S j S j Sj SS
j
         =− − () + ∑ ξφ
() ,, , 3 MFP W I K z ii i j i j ij ii
j
         =− − () + ∑ ξφ
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23. For details on data sources, see the data appendix to Oliner and Sichel (2002).
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this paper. We extrapolated the series required for our framework through
2006, drawing largely on corresponding series in the NIPAs.
To calculate the income share for each type of capital in our framework,
we follow the BLS procedure that distributes total capital income across
assets by assuming that each asset earns the same rate of return net of
depreciation.
24 This is the same method used by Oliner and Sichel and by
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh.
25 Consistent with the standard practice in the
productivity literature, we allow these income shares to vary year by year.
26
These data and procedures generate a series for aggregate MFP growth via
equation 1. Given this series as a top-line control, we estimate MFP growth
in each sector with the “dual” method employed by various researchers in
the past.
27 This method uses data on the prices of output and inputs, rather
than their quantities, to calculate sectoral MFP growth. We opt for the dual
approach because the sectoral data on prices are available on a more timely
basis than the corresponding quantity data. Roughly speaking, the dual
method compares the rate of change in a sector’s output price with that of
its input costs. Sectors in which prices fall quickly compared with their input
costs are estimated to have experienced relatively rapid MFP growth.
28
90 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
24. The weight on the capital deepening term in equation 1 for type-j capital equals its
income share minus its adjustment cost elasticity. As discussed below, empirical estimates
of these asset-speciﬁc elasticities are not available, which forces us to approximate the the-
oretically correct weights. Note that the weights on the capital deepening terms in equation 1
sum to one minus the labor share under constant returns to scale. We replace the theoretically
correct weights with standard income-share weights that also sum to one minus the labor
share. This approximation attaches the correct weight to aggregate capital deepening but
may result in some misallocation of the weights across asset types.
25. Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002); Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002, 2007).
26. Year-by-year share weighting embeds the implicit assumption that ﬁrms satisfy the
static ﬁrst-order condition that equates the marginal product of capital with its user cost.
Strictly speaking, this assumption is not valid in the presence of adjustment costs, as noted
by BFS and by Groth, Nuñez, and Srinivasan (2006). Both of those studies replace the year-
by-year share weights with the average shares over periods of ﬁve years or more, in an effort
to approximate a steady-state relationship that might be expected to hold on average over
longer periods. We found, however, that our results were little changed by replacing year-
by-year shares with period-average shares. Accordingly, we adhere to the usual share weighting
practice in the literature.
27. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002, 2007), Oliner and
Sichel (2000, 2002), and Triplett (1996), among others.
28. Oliner and Sichel (2002) give a nontechnical description of the way in which we
implement the dual method, and the appendix in the working paper version of this paper
(Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh, 2007) provides the algebraic details.
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tion 2) involves the Domar weight for each sector, the ratio of the sector’s
gross output to aggregate value added. For the four NIPA-based ﬁnal-output
sectors, gross output simply equals the value of the sector’s ﬁnal sales, which
we estimate using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For
the semiconductor sector we calculate gross output based on data from the
Semiconductor Industry Association as well as data constructed by Federal
Reserve Board staff to support the Federal Reserve’s published data on
U.S. industrial production.
The ﬁnal step is to calculate the inﬂuence of adjustment costs and factor
utilization on the growth of both aggregate and sectoral MFP. In princi-
ple, we could use equations 3 and 4 to calculate the effects at the sectoral
level and then aggregate those effects using equation 2. However, as
equations 3 and 4 show, this bottom-up approach requires highly dis-
aggregated data on investment and the workweek and equally disaggregated
output elasticities with respect to adjustment costs and the workweek (the
φ’s and the ξ’s). Unfortunately, estimates of the required sectoral elastici-
ties are not available.
To make use of readily available estimates, we work instead from the top
down. That is, we model the effects of adjustment costs and the workweek
for the nonfarm business sector as a whole and then distribute the aggregate
effects across sectors. Let W
.
and ξ denote, respectively, the percentage
change in the workweek for aggregate nonfarm business and the elasticity
of nonfarm business output with respect to this aggregate workweek. Then
the workweek effect for aggregate nonfarm business equals ξW
.
. Similarly,









, and φ denote, respectively, growth in aggregate real investment spend-
ing, growth in aggregate real capital services, and the aggregate adjust-
ment cost elasticity. To complete the top-down approach, we assume that
the adjustment cost and workweek effects are uniform across sectors. Under
this assumption, the top-down version of equations 2 through 4 is as follows
(starting with the sectoral equations):
() ( ) 6
1
MFP W I K z SS          =− − ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ +
μ
ξφ  
() ( ) 5
1
MFP W I K z ii          =− − ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ +
μ
ξφ  
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Ps from equations 5 and 6.
Equations 5 through 7 serve as our empirical counterpart to equations 2
through 4.
We follow BFS in specifying ξ, W
.
, and φ. Starting with the workweek
effect, we specify the aggregate elasticity ξto be a weighted average of BFS’s
sectoral estimates of ξ for durable manufacturing, nondurable manufacturing,
and nonmanufacturing. Using weights that reﬂect current-dollar output shares
in these sectors, we obtain an aggregate value of ξ equal to 1.24. To measure
the workweek itself, we use the BLS series for production or nonsupervisory
workers from the monthly survey of establishments. Because the workweek
in equations 5 through 7 is intended to measure cyclical variation in factor
use, we detrend the log of this monthly series with the Hodrick-Prescott
filter (with λ=10,000,000 as in BFS) and use the detrended series to cal-
culate W
.
on an annual basis.
With regard to adjustment costs, we set the output elasticity φ equal to
0.035.
29 This elasticity is based on estimates of capital adjustment costs by
Shapiro.
30 More recent studies provide estimates of adjustment costs on both
sides of φ=0.035. Robert Hall estimates capital adjustment costs in an Euler
equation framework similar to Shapiro’s but uses more-disaggregated data
and a different set of instruments for estimation.
31 Hall cannot reject the
hypothesis that φ=0. In contrast, Charlotta Groth, using industry-level
data for the United Kingdom, estimates φ to be about 0.055.
32 The divergent
results in these studies highlight the uncertainty surrounding estimates of
capital adjustment costs but do not suggest the need to move away from a
baseline estimate of φ=0.035. We apply this elasticity to the difference
between the growth rates of aggregate real business ﬁxed investment from





To summarize, we use annual data from BEA and BLS through 2006 to
implement the aggregate growth accounting framework in equation 1. This
() ( ) 7 MFP MFP MFP W I K ii
i
SS            =+ = − ∑μμ ξ φ        −             ++ ∑μμ ii
i
SS zz    ,
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29. BFS used a larger value for φ, 0.05, but subsequently corrected some errors that had




10657-02a_Oliner.qxd  8/15/07  10:12 AM  Page 92framework yields an annual time series for aggregate MFP growth. We then
use the dual method to allocate this aggregate MFP growth across sectors.
Finally, we calculate the effects of adjustment costs and changes in factor
utilization on both aggregate and sectoral MFP growth, drawing heavily
on parameter values reported by BFS.
Results
Table 1 presents our decomposition of labor productivity growth in the
nonfarm business sector using the published data described above. These
data exclude intangible capital other than business investment in software,
which, again, is already treated as an investment good in the NIPAs. The
next section fully incorporates intangible capital into our measurement
system and presents an augmented set of growth accounting results.
Focusing ﬁrst on the published data, table 1 shows that average annual
growth in labor productivity picked up from about 1.5 percent a year
during 1973–95 to about 2.5 percent during the second half of the 1990s
and then rose further, to more than 2.8 percent, in the period after 2000.
Our results indicate that an important part of the initial acceleration (about
0.6 percentage point of the total speedup of just over 1 percentage point)
reﬂected the greater use of IT capital. In addition, growth of MFP rose
notably in the IT-producing sectors, with an especially large increase for
producers of semiconductors. The pickup for the semiconductor sector
mirrors the unusually rapid decline in semiconductor prices from 1995 to
2000, which the model interprets as a speedup in MFP growth.
33 The last
line of the table shows that, all told, IT capital deepening and faster MFP
growth for IT producers more than accounted for the total speedup in labor
productivity growth during 1995–2000. These results confirm that the
IT-centric story for the late 1990s holds up after incorporating the latest
vintage of data and extending the framework to account for adjustment
costs and utilization effects.
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33. Jorgenson (2001) argues that the steeper declines in semiconductor prices reﬂected a
shift from three-year to two-year technology cycles starting in the mid-1990s. Aizcorbe, Oliner,
and Sichel (2006) report that shorter technology cycles drove semiconductor prices down more
rapidly after 1995, but they also estimated that price-cost markups for semiconductor producers
narrowed from 1995 to 2001. Accordingly, the faster price declines in the late 1990s—and the
associated pickup in MFP growth—partly reﬂected true improvements in technology and partly
changes in markups. These results suggest some caution in interpreting price-based swings
in MFP growth as a proxy for corresponding swings in the pace of technological advance.
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in utilization during this period (the two lines under “Growth of MFP”).
These two factors, on net, do not explain any of the upward swing in MFP
growth from 1973–95 to 1995–2000, which is consistent with the results
in BFS. Although the greater utilization of capital and labor had a positive
effect on MFP growth during 1995–2000, this inﬂuence was offset by the
negative effect from the higher adjustment costs induced by the invest-
ment boom of that period.
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Table 1. Contributions to Growth in Labor Productivity Based on Published Data
a
Change at  Change at
1973–95 1995–2000 2000–06 1995  2000 
Item (1) (2) (3) (2) – (1) (3) – (2)
Growth of labor productivity  1.47 2.51 2.86 1.04 0.35
in the nonfarm business 
sector (percent a year)
b
Contributions from (percentage points):
Capital deepening 0.76 1.11 0.85 0.35 −0.26
IT capital 0.46 1.09 0.61 0.63 −0.48
Computer hardware 0.25 0.60 0.28 0.35 −0.32
Software 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.21 −0.14
Communications 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.08 −0.01
equipment
Other tangible capital 0.30 0.02 0.24 −0.28 0.22
Improvement in labor quality 0.27 0.26 0.34 −0.01 0.08
Growth of MFP 0.44 1.14 1.67 0.70 0.53
Effect of adjustment costs 0.04 −0.11 0.08 −0.15 0.19
Effect of utilization −0.03 0.13 −0.09 0.16 −0.22
Growth of MFP excluding  0.42 1.11 1.68 0.69 0.57
above effects
IT-producing sectors 0.28 0.75 0.51 0.47 −0.24
Semiconductors 0.09 0.45 0.23 0.36 −0.22
Computer hardware 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.07 −0.09
Software 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.05
Communications 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01
equipment
Other nonfarm business 0.15 0.36 1.17 0.21 0.81




a. Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.
b. Measured as 100 times the average annual log difference for the indicated years.
c. Sum of capital deepening for IT capital and growth of MFP in IT-producing sectors.
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though labor productivity accelerated another 0.35 percentage point, the
growth contributions from IT capital deepening and MFP advances in
IT-producing sectors dropped back substantially. At the same time, MFP
growth strengthened in the rest of nonfarm business, adding roughly 
3⁄4 per-
centage point to annual labor productivity growth during 2000–06 from
its 1995–2000 average. And, given the minimal growth in hours worked
after 2000, even the anemic advance in investment outlays led to a posi-
tive swing in the growth contribution from non-IT capital deepening
(“Other tangible capital”).
34
All in all, table 1 indicates that IT-related factors retreated from center
stage after 2000 and that other factors—most notably, a surge in MFP
growth outside the IT-producing sectors—were responsible for the contin-
ued rapid advance in labor productivity as reported in the published data.
35
Nonetheless, averaging over the period 1995–2006, the use and production of
IT capital are important, accounting for roughly two-thirds of the post-1995
step-up in labor productivity growth. The next section of the paper examines
whether the inclusion of intangible capital changes this characterization.
We conclude this discussion with two points. The ﬁrst concerns the use
of the year 2000 as the breakpoint for comparing the boom period of the
late 1990s with more recent years. We chose 2000 rather than 2001 to avoid
splitting the two periods at a recession year, which would have accentuated
the need for cyclical adjustments. However, our main ﬁndings are robust
to breaking the two periods at 2001. Second, our big-picture results are very
similar to those in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh,
36 which contains the latest
estimates from the framework pioneered by Dale Jorgenson. Consistent
with our ﬁndings, their framework emphasizes the role of IT in explaining
the step-up in labor productivity growth during 1995–2000. It also shows
a reduced contribution from IT after 2000, which was more than offset by
other factors. The differences in results are relatively minor and largely
stem from the broader sectoral coverage in the Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh
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34. The combined effect of adjustment costs and factor utilization remained essentially
zero after 2000. Although the deceleration in investment spending after 2000 eliminated
the negative effect of adjustment costs, the net decline in the workweek pushed the utiliza-
tion effect into negative territory.
35. Of course, MFP growth is a residual, so this result speaks only to the proximate sources
of growth and does not shed light on the more fundamental forces driving MFP growth.
36. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007).
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from owner-occupied housing and consumer durable goods into both output
and capital input. The stocks of these assets have grown rapidly since the
mid-1990s, and so Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh’s estimates of non-IT capital
deepening are larger than those reported here.
Aggregate Growth Accounting with Intangible Capital
The growth accounting analysis in the previous section relies on published
data, which exclude virtually all types of intangible capital except software.
As argued by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel,
37 any intangible asset that gen-
erates a service ﬂow beyond the current period should be included in the
capital stock, and the production of such assets should be included in current-
period output. Applying this standard, in their 2006 paper (henceforth
CHS) Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel estimated that the intangible investment
excluded from the NIPAs amounted to roughly $1 trillion annually over
2000–03, an amount nearly equal to outlays for business ﬁxed investment
included in the national accounts, and they constructed a growth account-
ing system that includes a broad set of intangibles through 2003.
Of total business investment in intangibles, CHS estimate that scientiﬁc
and nonscientiﬁc R&D each accounted for about 19 percent during 2000–03;
computerized information, which consists mostly of the software cate-
gory already included in the NIPAs, accounted for 14 percent; brand
equity accounted for 13 percent; and ﬁrm-speciﬁc organizational capital
accounted for about 35 percent. The last category contains many well-known
examples of the successful deployment of intangible capital, including
Wal-Mart’s supply-chain technology, Dell’s build-to-order business model,
and Intel’s expertise in organizing semiconductor production.
38
The CHS estimates of intangible investment and capital are a valuable
addition to the literature, but the source data for their series are currently
available only through 2004 or 2005. Thus their approach cannot be used
to develop growth accounting estimates that are as timely as those based on
published data. As an alternative, we construct a data system for intangi-
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37. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006).
38. See Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002), and McKinsey
Global Institute (2002) for interesting case studies regarding the creation of organizational
capital.
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BFOS model, ﬁrms use intangible capital as a complement to their IT cap-
ital. Because of this connection to IT capital, we can generate estimates of
intangible investment and capital from published data on IT capital and
related series.
BFOS used their model for a more limited purpose: to specify and esti-
mate regressions to discern whether intangibles could explain the MFP
growth patterns in published industry data. They did not formally build
intangibles into an integrated growth accounting framework along the lines
of CHS. That is precisely what we do here.
39
Description of the Model
The basic features of the BFOS model are as follows. Firms have a
(value-added) production function in which IT capital and intangible cap-
ital are complementary inputs:
where Kt
IT, Rt, and Kt
NT denote IT capital, intangible capital, and tangible
capital other than IT capital, respectively; Lt is labor input; and zt is the level
of technology. For simplicity, BFOS assume that there are no adjustment
costs and that factor utilization does not vary. The function G that com-
bines IT capital and intangible capital is assumed to take the constant
elasticity of substitution form:
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between Kt
IT and Rt, and a governs
the income share of each type of capital.
Because Kt
IT and Rt are separable from other inputs, ﬁrms minimize costs
by ﬁrst choosing the optimal combination of Kt
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39. The BFOS model focuses on intangibles that are related to information technology.
This is a narrower purview than in Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006), who develop
estimates for a full range of intangible assets, regardless of their connection to IT. Although
we do not provide a comprehensive accounting for intangibles, we highlight the intangible
assets that are central to an assessment of the contribution of information technology to
economic growth.
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the usual ﬁrst-order condition sets the ratio of the marginal products of
Kt
IT and Rt equal to the ratio of their user costs, which implies
where r t
IT and r t
R denote the respective user costs. Equation 10 implies the
following expression for the growth of intangible capital:
Importantly, equation 11 enables us to calculate a model-implied series for
the growth rate of intangible capital based solely on data for IT capital
and user costs and on an assumed value for the elasticity of substitution
between intangible capital and IT capital. No direct data on intangible
capital are required. We chain together the time series of growth rates
from equation 11 to produce an indexed series for the level of real intan-
gible capital, R.
To implement equation 11, we calculate K
.
t
IT and r .
t
IT from the same BLS
data that we used in the previous section. We also need to specify the user
cost for intangible capital (r
R
t ) and the elasticity of substitution between
IT capital and intangible capital (σ). We use data from CHS to calculate
r .
t
R and σ, as described next.
CHS measure the user cost of intangible capital in accord with the stan-
dard Hall and Jorgenson formulation:
40
where p
R is the price index for this type of capital, ρ is the nominal rate of
return net of depreciation, δ
R is the depreciation rate, ΠR is the expected
capital gain over and above that captured in the depreciation rate, and T
R
accounts for the tax treatment of intangible assets. Equation 12 is identical
to the user cost formula that we employ for all other types of capital in our
growth accounting framework. We adopt CHS’s speciﬁcation of each
term in the user cost formula.
() , 12 rp T
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40. Hall and Jorgenson (1967).
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CHS series for the income shares of IT capital and intangible capital.
41 If
σ were equal to one (the Cobb-Douglas case), the ratio of the IT income
share to the intangible income share drawn from data in CHS (which we
denote by αt
R,CHS) would be constant. In fact, the ratio of the IT income
share to the intangible income share trends upward in the CHS data. Given
that the user cost of IT capital has fallen relative to that of intangible cap-
ital, the upward trend in the share ratio implies more substitution toward
IT capital than would occur in the Cobb-Douglas case. We ﬁnd that setting
σ to 1.25 approximates the upward trend in the share ratio.
To complete the system, we need a nominal anchor to convert the indexed
series for Rt to dollar values. For the nominal anchor, we require that the
average income share of intangible capital in our framework over 1973–2003
(denoted α –
t
R,BFOS) equal the average value of the CHS-based share over
the same period:
42
To satisfy equation 13, we scale the indexed levels series for intangible
capital, Rt, by ψ. The income share for intangible capital in year t is then
where the denominator equals the sum of published nonfarm business
income and the income accruing to intangible capital. We average equa-
tion 14 over the period 1973–2003, substitute the average share into the
left-hand side of equation 13, and solve for the scaling factor ψ. We then
apply this scaling factor to the indexed levels series for Rt and denote the
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41. Speciﬁcally, for the income share of intangible capital, we use the income share
series for “New CHS intangibles,” that is, those intangibles over and above those included
in the NIPAs. We then adjust this series downward to account for the fact that some CHS
intangibles are not related to IT and thus do not ﬁt in the BFOS framework. As a crude
adjustment, we remove the income share associated with brand equity and one-third of the
income share for other components of “New CHS intangibles.”
42. We use 2003 as the ﬁnal year for this calculation because that is the last year of data
in CHS.
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inventory equation:
We calculate growth in real intangible investment from the series for Nt*.
We now have all the pieces we need to incorporate intangibles into our
growth accounting framework. An important point is that including intan-
gible assets affects both the output and the input sides of the production
accounts. On the output side, the growth of production equals a weighted
average of growth in real intangible investment N* and growth in published
real nonfarm business output. The weight for each component equals its
share in the augmented measure of current-dollar output. On the input side,
the total contribution from capital now includes a term for intangible cap-
ital, calculated as the income share for intangible capital times the growth
rate of this capital in real terms, αt
R,BFOS × R ˙. The income shares for all
other inputs are scaled down so that the shares (including that for intangible
capital) sum to one.
43
Results
The results from this augmented growth accounting framework, shown
in table 2, differ in important respects from the results based on published
data. As can be seen by comparing the ﬁrst two lines, labor productivity
growth during 1995–2000 becomes stronger once we include intangibles,
but it becomes less robust during 2000–06. Indeed, in the augmented
framework, the productivity advance since 2000 is estimated to be well
below that posted during 1995–2000, reversing the relative growth rates
for the two periods based on published data. This reversal arises from
the time proﬁle for real investment in intangibles. As shown in the lower
part of the table, real intangible investment is estimated to have surged dur-
ing 1995–2000, boosting growth in aggregate output, and then retreated
during 2000–06.
() * ** . 15 1 1 NR R tt
R
t =− − ( ) − δ
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43. See Yang and Brynjolfsson (2001) for an alternative approach to incorporating
intangibles into a standard growth accounting framework. Their approach relies on ﬁnan-
cial market valuations to infer the amount of unmeasured intangible investment and shows
that, through 1999, the inclusion of intangibles had potentially sizable effects on the mea-
sured growth of MFP.
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Table 2. Contributions to Growth in Labor Productivity: Accounting for Intangibles
a
Change at  Change at 
1973–95 1995–2000 2000–06 1995 2000 
Item (1) (2) (3) (2) – (1) (3) – (2)
Growth of labor productivity 
in the nonfarm business 
sector (percent a year)
b
Based on published data
c 1.47 2.51 2.86 1.04 0.35
Accounting for intangibles
d 1.58 2.95 2.43 1.37 −0.52
Contributions from (percentage points):
e
Capital deepening 0.94 1.40 0.75 0.46 −0.65
IT capital 0.44 1.02 0.57 0.58 −0.45
Other tangible capital 0.29 0.02 0.22 −0.27 0.20
New intangible capital 0.22 0.36 −0.04 0.14 −0.40
Improvement in labor quality 0.26 0.25 0.32 −0.01 0.07
Growth of MFP 0.37 1.31 1.36 0.94 0.05
Effect of adjustment costs 0.04 −0.12 0.10 −0.16 0.22
Effect of utilization −0.03 0.13 −0.09 0.16 −0.22
Growth of MFP excluding  0.36 1.30 1.34 0.94 0.04
above effects
IT-producing sectors 0.26 0.72 0.47 0.46 −0.25
Intangible sector 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.07 −0.01
Other nonfarm business 0.09 0.50 0.81 0.41 0.31
Memoranda: Growth rates (percent a year)
b
Real intangible investment 5.7 12.0 −4.6 6.3 −16.6
Real intangible capital  6.8 7.7 −0.7 0.9 −8.4
services
Real IT capital services 15.6 20.4 8.9 4.8 −11.5
User cost, intangible capital 4.6 1.2 3.6 −3.4 2.4
User cost, IT capital −2.4 −9.0 −4.1 −6.6 4.9
Nominal shares (percent)
Expenditure share, intangible  4.6 6.2 5.1 1.6 −1.1
investment
Income share, intangible  4.7 6.4 6.5 1.7 0.1
capital
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.
b. Measured as 100 times the average annual log difference for the indicated years.
c. From table 1.
d. Derived using methodology discussed in the text.
e. Contributions to growth of nonfarm business labor productivity with accounting for intangibles.
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gible capital” in table 2) follows the general pattern for IT capital, moving
higher during 1995–2000 and then falling back. This similarity reﬂects
the explicit link between intangible capital and IT capital in the BFOS
model. The lower part of the table provides full detail on the growth of
intangible capital and its determinants from equation 11. Despite the broadly
similar growth contour for intangible capital and IT capital across periods,
intangible capital increases much less rapidly than IT capital in each period,
because of the quality-adjusted declines in IT prices that cause the user cost
of IT capital to trend lower. This user cost effect became more pronounced
during 1995–2000—when the prices for IT capital goods fell especially
rapidly—restraining the growth of intangible capital even though the growth
of IT capital jumped.
Taken together, the revisions to the output and the input sides of the
growth accounting equation imply a revised path for MFP growth, after
controlling for the effects of adjustment costs and factor utilization (“Growth
of MFP excluding above effects”). The inclusion of intangibles leaves a
somewhat smaller imprint on MFP growth than on the growth of labor
productivity, as the revisions to the two sides of the growth accounting
equation are partly offsetting. Consistent with the more muted revision from
the published data, the path for MFP continues to show the fastest growth
after 2000. However, the pickup in MFP growth from 1995–2000 to
2000–06, at 0.04 percentage point, is negligible compared with that indi-
cated by published data (see the equivalent line in table 1).
Robustness Checks
The BFOS model imposes a strictly contemporaneous relationship
between the growth of intangible capital and the growth of IT capital. This
relationship may be too tight, as the two forms of capital accumulation
may be subject to (unmodeled) adjustment costs and differences in project
length from the planning stage to ﬁnal rollout.
To examine the robustness of our results, we consider alternative timing
assumptions for the growth of intangible capital. The ﬁrst two alternatives
smooth the growth of intangible capital without introducing leads or lags
relative to the growth in IT capital. The idea is that some projects to pro-
duce intangible capital may be long-lived and thus may not display the
same stops and starts as purchases of IT capital. We implement this timing
102 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
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the growth rate of IT capital and its user cost on the right-hand side of
equation 11. The third timing change allows intangible capital growth to
lag IT capital growth by a year but does not affect the relative volatility of
the series. This timing assumption embeds the often-expressed view that
ﬁrms take time to accumulate the intangible capital needed to fully lever-
age their IT investments.
Our reading of the literature suggests that the ﬁrst two alternatives ﬁt
the facts better than the introduction of a systematic lag from IT capital to
intangible capital. Case studies published elsewhere portray the installation
of IT capital and associated changes in business practices and organiza-
tion as interwoven rather than strictly sequential.
44 Sinan Aral, Erik Bryn-
jolfsson, and D. J. Wu support this view, noting that “[as] ﬁrms successfully
implement IT (and complementary intangible investments) and experience
greater marginal beneﬁts from IT investments, they react by investing in
more IT,” a process they characterize as a “virtuous cycle.”
45 Nonethe-
less, we consider the scenario with the lagged accumulation of intangible
capital for the sake of completeness.
As the top panel of table 3 shows, these alternative timing assumptions
have some effect on the period-by-period growth of real intangible capital
but do not change the basic result, namely, that this type of capital essen-
tially has not grown since 2000. The series for intangible investment, shown
in the bottom panel of the table, is also reasonably robust to alternative
timing assumptions. In each case, real intangible investment is estimated
to have declined since 2000. As a further robustness check, the table also
displays the CHS series for intangible capital and intangible investment,
which we have extended through 2005 based on some of the key source
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44. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002), and McKinsey
Global Institute (2002).
45. Aral, Brynjolfsson, and Wu (2006, p. 2). Some interpret the econometric results in
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) as support for a lag between the installation of IT capital and
the accumulation of complementary capital. We believe this interpretation is incorrect.
Brynjolfsson and Hitt show that the ﬁrm-level effect of computerization on MFP growth is
much stronger when evaluated over multiyear periods than when evaluated on a year-by-year
basis. Importantly, however, the variables in their regression are all measured contempora-
neously, whether over single-year or multiyear periods. Accordingly, their results suggest
that the correlation between the growth of IT capital and intangible capital may be low on a
year-by-year basis, but that a stronger contemporaneous correlation holds over longer periods,
boosting the measured effect on MFP growth.
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for illustrative purposes only and should not be regarded as ofﬁcial CHS
data.) The extended CHS series for intangible investment and capital exhibit
patterns across periods that are broadly similar to those in our series.
Notably, the CHS series decelerate sharply after 2000, and the growth rates
for 2000–05 are the weakest for the three periods shown, confirming an
important qualitative feature of our estimates. Because the CHS series are
constructed independently from the series in this paper, the qualitative cor-
respondence between them lends credibility to the basic thrust of our results,
if not to the precise ﬁgures.
Table 4 explores the growth accounting implications of the alternative
timing assumptions for intangible capital. For each timing assumption we
show three key variables: growth in labor productivity, the growth contribu-
tion from intangible capital deepening, and MFP growth (after controlling
for the effects of adjustment costs and factor utilization). Most features of
the baseline results are robust to the alternative assumptions. In every case,
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Table 3. Growth of Intangible Capital and Investment Under Alternative Timing




Timing assumption 1973–95 1995–2000 2000–05
Intangible capital services
Baseline timing for intangible capital growth 6.8 7.7 −0.9
Three-year centered moving average 6.9 7.1 −0.3
Five-year centered moving average 6.8 6.7 0.4
One-year lag relative to baseline 7.4 7.1 −0.2




Baseline timing for intangible capital growth 5.7 12.0 −6.2
Three-year centered moving average 6.1 9.1 −5.2
Five-year centered moving average 6.1 8.5 −4.1
One-year lag relative to baseline 6.9 8.8 −8.7




a. The alternative timing assumptions pertain to growth of intangible capital. The effect on intangible investment is calculated
through the perpetual inventory relationship linking investment and capital.
b. From Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2006), series for “New CHS intangibles,” with preliminary extension to 2005 estimated
by the authors.
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than during 2000–06, reversing the relative growth rates based on published
data. In addition, the growth contribution from intangible capital deepening
is always largest during 1995–2000 and then drops back to essentially zero
during 2000–06. Finally, although the alternative timing assumptions gen-
erate a larger step-up in MFP growth after 2000 than in the baseline, they
nonetheless temper the increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point relative to
the published data.
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Table 4. Growth in Labor Productivity and Selected Growth Contributions Under
Alternative Timing Assumptions for Intangible Capital
a
Change at  Change at 
1973–95 1995–2000 2000–06  1995  2000 
Item (1) (2) (3) (2) – (1) (3) – (2)
Baseline
b
Labor productivity growth 1.58 2.95 2.43 1.37 −0.52
Contribution from  0.22 0.36 −0.04 0.14 −0.40
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP  0.36 1.30 1.34 0.94 0.04
growth
c
Three-year centered moving average
Labor productivity growth 1.59 2.77 2.56 1.18 −0.21
Contribution from  0.22 0.32 0.00 0.10 −0.32
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP  0.38 1.13 1.45 0.75 0.32
growth
c
Five-year centered moving average
Labor productivity growth 1.59 2.72 2.59 1.13 −0.13
Contribution from  0.22 0.29 0.02 0.07 −0.27
intangible capital
Contribution from MFP  0.38 1.11 1.46 0.73 0.35
growth
c
One-year lag relative to baseline
Labor productivity growth 1.62 2.77 2.51 1.15 −0.26
Contribution from  0.23 0.32 0.01 0.09 −0.31
intangible capital




a. Growth of labor productivity is in percent a year and is measured as 100 times the average annual log difference for the indicated
years. Growth contributions are in percentage points.
b. From table 2.
c. After controlling for effects of adjustment costs and utilization.
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We now turn to the industry origins of U.S. productivity growth during
the late 1990s and after 2000. The aggregate data show that the sources of
productivity growth changed after 2000, which suggests that the industry-
level origins of aggregate productivity growth and the underlying forces
may also have changed. To explore this, we construct productivity accounts
for sixty industries that span the U.S. private economy from 1988 to 2005.
Although measurement error, omitted variables, and endogeneity problems
always make it difficult to identify the sources of productivity gains, we
make some progress by exploiting cross-sectional variation in industry
productivity over time and by examining the link between productivity
and observable factors such as IT intensity and changing proﬁt shares.
The industry analysis presented here focuses on labor productivity,
reflecting our interest in understanding the industry origins of aggregate
labor productivity growth. Moreover, we do not have the detailed data on
labor quality, intangible investment, or adjustment costs at the industry level
necessary to create comparable estimates of MFP growth. To the extent
that intangible capital is correlated with IT investment, however, one can
interpret the IT intensity results as broadly indicative of the whole suite of
activities that are complementary to IT.
Output Measures, Data, and Summary Statistics
OUTPUT MEASURES. Industry output can be measured using either a
gross output or a value-added concept, each with its advantages and dis-
advantages.
46 Gross output corresponds closely to the conventional idea of
output or sales and reﬂects all inputs including capital, labor, and intermediate
energy, materials, and services. Value added, by contrast, is a somewhat
artiﬁcial concept that strips out the contribution of intermediate inputs and
incorporates only capital and labor.
Although both value added and gross output are used for productivity
analysis, we favor gross output. Empirical work by, among others, Michael
Bruno; J. R. Norsworthy and David Malmquist; Jorgenson, Frank Gollop,
106 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
46. For background on industry productivity analysis, see Jorgenson, Gollop, and
Fraumeni (1987), Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997, 2001, 2007), Nordhaus (2002b), Stiroh
(2002a, 2002b), Triplett and Bosworth (2004), and Bosworth and Triplett (2007).
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separability grounds.
47 Basu and Fernald show that using value-added
data leads to biased estimates and incorrect inferences about production
parameters.
48 A later contribution by the same authors argues against the
value-added function because failure of the neoclassical assumption about
perfect competition implies that some of the contribution of intermediate
inputs remains in measured value-added growth.
49 Value added has the
advantage, however, that it aggregates directly to GDP.
DATA. We use three pieces of U.S. industry-level data—output, hours,
and capital stock—from government sources. The ﬁrst two create a panel
of average labor productivity (ALP) across U.S. industries, and the third is
used to develop measures of the intensity of the use of IT. One practical
difﬁculty is the recent conversion of the industry data from the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) system to the North American Industrial
Classiﬁcation (NAICS) system, which makes it difﬁcult to construct long
historical time series or to directly compare the most recent data with
earlier results.
BEA publishes annual data on value added and gross output for sixty-ﬁve
industries that together make up the private U.S. economy.
50 These data,
which are based on an integrated set of input-output and industry production
accounts, span 1947–2005 for real value added and 1987–2005 for real gross
output. Although BEA also publishes various measures of employment
by industry, it does not provide industry-level series on hours worked. We
obtain hours by industry from the Output and Employment database main-
tained by the Ofﬁce of Occupational Statistics and Employment Projections
at BLS. Complete data on total hours for all industries begin in 1988.
51
Because these hours data are currently available only to 2004, we use the
growth rate of full-time equivalent employees for the disaggregated indus-
tries, from BEA data, to proxy for hours growth in 2005.
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47. Bruno (1978); Norsworthy and Malmquist (1983); Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni
(1987).
48. Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997).
49. Basu and Fernald (2001).
50. Howells, Barefoot, and Lindberg (2006).
51. The underlying sources of these data are the BLS Current Employment Survey
(for wage and salary jobs and average weekly hours), the Current Population Survey (for
self-employed and unpaid workers, agricultural workers, and within-household employ-
ment), and unemployment insurance tax records.
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worked and real gross output per hour worked—by combining the BEA
output data with the BLS hours data across industries for 1988 to 2005.
The third data source is the Fixed Asset accounts from BEA for non-
residential capital. These data include forty-six different types of non-
residential capital for sixty-three disaggregated NAICS industries since
1987. To estimate capital services we map the asset-speciﬁc service prices
from Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh onto these assets and employ Tornqvist
aggregation using the service price and a two-period average of the capital
stock for each asset in each industry.
52 The resulting measure of capital
services is an approximation, because we miss industry variation in rates
of return, asset-speciﬁc inﬂation, and tax code parameters. Nevertheless,
it captures the relatively high service prices for short-lived assets such as
IT capital, deﬁned as above to include computer hardware, software, and
communications equipment.
We combine these three sources of data to form a panel from 1988 to
2005 for a private industry aggregate, ﬁfteen broad sectors, and sixty dis-
aggregated industries. The ﬁfteen-sector breakdown follows BEA’s con-
vention, except that manufacturing is broken into durables and nondurables.
The number of disaggregated industries is smaller than that available from
either BEA or BLS, because of the need to generate consistently deﬁned
industries across all data sources. All aggregation is done via Tornqvist
indices, except for hours, which are simply summed. Both the broad sectors
and the disaggregated industries sum to the private industry aggregates of
nominal output from BEA, hours from BLS, and nominal nonresidential
capital from BEA. The list of industries and their 2005 value added are
reported in appendix table A-1.
SUMMARY STATISTICS. Table 5 reports estimates of labor productiv-
ity growth from our industry data and compares them with the latest
estimates from BLS. The first two lines of the top panel report average
annual growth of ALP for the BLS business and nonfarm business sectors,
and the third line reports the private industry aggregate described above.
Although our private industry aggregate grows somewhat less rapidly
than the BLS aggregates, all three series show similar trends: a pickup of
ALP growth of about 1 percentage point after 1995 and a smaller increase
after 2000.
108 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
52. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007).
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The second panel of table 5 reports estimates for the ﬁfteen broad NAICS
sectors. These sectors range in size from the very large ﬁnance, insurance,
real estate, rental, and leasing sector, at 23.3 percent of 2005 value added,
to the very small agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing, and hunting sector, at only
1.1 percent. In terms of ALP growth, eight of these ﬁfteen sectors, which
accounted for 73 percent of value added in 2005, showed faster productivity
growth over 1995–2000 than over 1988–95.
53 The further acceleration in
aggregate productivity after 2000 occurred in seven sectors, which accounted
for only 44 percent of 2005 value added. Although productivity in the
large retail trade, wholesale trade, and ﬁnance sectors all decelerated after
2000, the two trade sectors continued to post impressive productivity gains
through 2005.
The pickup in aggregate productivity growth in the mid-1990s appears
to have originated in different sectors than did the subsequent step-up in
2000. Six sectors (agriculture, durable goods, wholesale trade, retail trade,
ﬁnance, and arts and entertainment) show an acceleration after 1995 but a
deceleration after 2000, whereas ﬁve sectors (construction, nondurables,
utilities, information, and other services) show the opposite pattern.
Together these eleven sectors produced 72 percent of value added in 2005.
In their analysis of MFP growth, Corrado and others reach a similar con-
clusion, although Bosworth and Triplett emphasize the continued impor-
tance of service industries as a source of aggregate productivity growth.
54
Table 5 also summarizes, in the third and fourth panels, the disaggregated
industry data by reporting the mean, median, and hours-weighted mean
productivity growth rates across these industries for gross output and value
added, respectively. One interesting observation is the divergence in
trends between gross output and value-added measures of productivity:
the post-1995 gains are strongest for gross output, whereas the post-2000
gains are strongest for value added. Both series incorporate the same
hours data, so that this divergence directly reﬂects differences between
the gross output and value-added output measures.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this divergence further.
For completeness, we report results for both gross output and value added,
53. As a comparison, Stiroh (2001, 2002b) reported an acceleration of ALP after 1995
for six of ten broad sectors, which accounted for the majority of output using earlier vintages
of SIC data.
54. Corrado and others (2007); Bosworth and Triplett (2007).































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10657-02a_Oliner.qxd  8/15/07  10:12 AM  Page 111although, again, we prefer gross output because it is a more fundamental
measure of production and does not require additional assumptions about
the nature of the production function.
Finally, we emphasize that there is enormous heterogeneity among the
disaggregated industries that lie beneath these summary statistics, both
within time periods and across time. For example, thirty-seven of the sixty
industries, which accounted for nearly 60 percent of aggregate output,
experienced an acceleration of productivity after 1995 but a decline after
2000, or vice versa. This highlights the widespread churning and reallocation
of resources among industries, which we show to be an important source
of aggregate productivity gains.
Industry Origins of the Aggregate Productivity Gains
We now review how the data for the disaggregated industries can be
aggregated to form economy-wide productivity estimates, and we employ
this familiar framework to identify the industry origins of the aggregate
productivity gains over 1988–2005.
DECOMPOSITION AND REALLOCATIONS. At the industry level, real value
added is deﬁned implicitly from a gross output production function as
where αV
i is the average share of nominal value added in nominal gross
output for industry i, and Mi denotes real intermediate inputs.55 One
attractive property of industry value added is that it aggregates to a simple
expression for growth in aggregate value added:
where vi is the average share of industry i’s nominal value added in aggre-
gate nominal value added. Aggregate hours worked, H, is the simple sum
of industry hours, Hi,
() , 17    Vv V ii
i
= ∑




i =+ − αα
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55. BEA uses the “double deﬂation” method to estimate real value added for all indus-
tries as the difference between real gross output and real intermediate inputs (Howells,
Barefoot, and Lindberg, 2006). Basu and Fernald (2001) show that this can be approxi-
mated, as in equation 16, by deﬁning gross output growth as a weighted average of value
added and intermediate input growth.
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V=V/H.
Equations 16, 17, and 18 can be combined to yield the following decom-
position of ALP growth:
56
where ALPY is industry labor productivity based on gross output and mi is
the average ratio of nominal industry intermediate inputs to nominal aggre-
gate value added. This equation simpliﬁes to
The ﬁrst term in equation 19 is a “direct productivity effect” equal to
the weighted average of growth in gross output labor productivity in the
component industries. The second term, RM, is a “reallocation of materials,”
which reﬂects variation in intermediate input intensity across industries. It
enters with a negative sign because when more intermediate inputs are used




, these must be netted out to reach aggregate pro-
ductivity. The third term, R
H, is a “reallocation of hours.” Aggregate hours
growth, H
.
, approximately weights industries by their (lagged) share of aggre-
gate hours, and so aggregate productivity rises if industries with value-added
shares above their hours shares—that is, those industries with relatively high
(nominal) productivity levels—experience growth in hours. Equation 20 is a
simpliﬁcation using value-added labor productivity at the industry level.
57
Table 6 reports estimates of the decomposition framework in equations
16 to 20. The ﬁrst line in the top panel repeats the productivity estimates
that come from the BEA data on aggregate private industry output and the
sum of hours worked from BLS. The second line reports the estimates we
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56. As in Stiroh (2002b).
57. This value-added approach is similar to the decomposition in Nordhaus (2002b).
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derive by explicitly aggregating the detailed industries as in equations
17 and 18. There is a small divergence for the middle period, but the two
estimates tell the same story of a large productivity acceleration after 1995
and a smaller one after 2000.
58
The second and third panels of table 6 report the decomposition from
equations 19 and 20 using gross output data and value-added data, respec-
tively. Both panels indicate a substantial increase in the direct contribution
of industry-level productivity after 1995 (1.31 percentage points for gross
output and 0.83 percentage point for value added), followed by a large
decline after 2000 for gross output (−0.94 percentage point) and no change
for value added.
Both the materials and hours reallocation terms turn positive after 2000,
boosting the aggregates and suggesting that an important part of the post-
2000 productivity gains stemmed from the shifting of inputs among indus-
tries.
59 In fact, we do not observe an increase in productivity growth after
2000 when looking at the direct industry contributions, an insight that is
only possible with industry-level data.
60
The materials reallocation term contributes positively to aggregate pro-
ductivity growth when gross output is growing faster than materials, which
implies that value added is growing faster than gross output (see equation 16).
This pattern has held since 2000 and likely reﬂects some combination of
substitution among inputs, biased technical change, and new production
opportunities such as outsourcing. Better understanding of these forces is
an important area for future work.
58. We also aggregated the industry output data using a Fisher (rather than the Tornqvist)
index and still found a small difference for the period 1995–2000. We do not have an expla-
nation for this.
59. Jorgenson and others (forthcoming) show an increase in both the intermediate input
and hours reallocation terms, although both are slightly negative through 2004. The results in
Bosworth and Triplett (2007) are similar to ours in some respects (rising direct contribution
of gross output productivity through 2000 followed by a substantial fall, and an intermediate
reallocation term that switches from negative to positive after 2000), but their hours realloca-
tion term remains negative through 2005. This divergence reﬂects differences in the estima-
tion of the hours series. Bosworth and Triplett (2007) use the BEA series on full-
time/part-time employees, which they scale by total hours per employee from BLS for 1987
to 2004. They hold hours per full-time/part-time employee constant from 2004 to 2005.
60. This is analogous to the analysis of the sources of productivity growth within the U.S.
retail trade sector by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002), who report that the majority
of productivity gains reﬂect entry and exit, with a very small contribution from productivity
gains within continuing establishments.
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The reallocation of hours is positive when industries with relatively
high productivity (in nominal terms) have strong hours growth. Growing
reallocations are consistent with the notion that increased competitive pres-
sures, ﬂexible labor markets, and restructuring were part of the productivity
story in recent years. Elsewhere Stiroh discusses some evidence of increased
ﬂexibility of U.S. labor markets and reports evidence of increased reallo-
cation across industries.
61
To provide an alternative perspective, we calculate the annual cross-
sectional correlation between hours growth and the lagged level of ALP for
the sixty disaggregated industries. Figure 1 plots the estimated correlations
for both the value-added and gross output measures of labor productivity;
the ﬁgure also shows the term from equation 19 for the annual reallocation
of hours to high-productivity industries. All three series seem to have
trended upward, particularly since the early 1990s, which suggests that
industries with relatively high productivity have become more likely to



















Source: Authors’ calculations using BLS and BEA data.
a. Annual cross-sectional correlation between hours growth and the lagged level of productivity for the sixty industries in 
appendix table A-1, calculated using industry value added.
b. Above correlation calculated using industry gross output.
c. Reallocation of hours to high-productivity industries as defined in equation 19. This is the difference between the aggregate 
growth rate of hours weighted by industry value added and the aggregate growth rate of hours weighted by hours in each of the 
sixty industries.
Figure 1. Link between Productivity and Hours Reallocation, 1989–2005
10657-02a_Oliner.qxd  8/16/07  11:38 AM  Page 116Stephen D. Oliner, Daniel E. Sichel, and Kevin J. Stiroh 117
cyclical component, as the correlations and hours reallocations rise during
recessions, consistent with the notion of a cleansing effect of recessions.
62
This interpretation of the reallocation of hours is suggestive; we have
provided neither a deep economic explanation nor sophisticated econo-
metric evidence that might identify the causal factors. Rather we are high-
lighting what appears to be an increasingly important source of aggregate
productivity growth and pointing toward further research.
ROLE OF IT CLASSIFICATIONS. Table 6 also quantiﬁes the direct contri-
butions from IT-producing, IT-using, and other industries. Consistent with
the classification scheme used by BEA,
63 we identify four industries as
IT-producing: computer and electronic products, publishing including
software, information and data processing services, and computer system
design and related services. Following Stiroh,
64 we identify industries as
IT-using if their IT capital income share (nominal IT capital income as a
share of nominal nonresidential capital income) is above the median for
all industries, excluding the four IT-producing industries. All remaining
industries are labeled “other industries.” This leaves four IT-producing
industries with nearly 5 percent of aggregate value added in the most recent
period, twenty-six IT-using industries with 59 percent, and thirty “other
industries” with the remainder.
65
As shown in table 6, the IT-producing and IT-using industries more than
account for the direct contribution from individual industries to the produc-
tivity acceleration during 1995–2000. After 2000, however, the impact of
IT is much less clear-cut, with the swing in the growth contributions from
all three groups of industries concentrated in a fairly narrow range.
For the full decade from 1995 to 2005, the direct contribution from
the IT-using industries was far larger than it had been over 1988–1995,
despite the decline after 2000 based on gross output data. In contrast, the
direct contribution from “other industries” remained smaller throughout
62. Caballero and Hammour (1994).
63. See, for example, Smith and Lum (2005) and Howells, Barefoot, and Lindberg (2006).
64. Stiroh (2002b).
65. Appendix table A-1 shows this classiﬁcation scheme for the sixty detailed industries
based on both 1995 and 2000 IT capital income shares and reports the 2005 share. Baily
and Lawrence (2001), Stiroh (2001), and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) also use relative
shares of IT capital in total capital to identify IT-intensive industries in the United States,
and Daveri and Mascotto (2002), Inklaar, O’Mahony, and Timmer (2005), O’Mahony and
van Ark (2003), and van Ark, Inklaar, and McGuckin (2003) do so in international studies.
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1995–2005 than it had been before 1995. This distinction highlights the
important role for IT use in driving the faster growth in productivity that
has prevailed over the entire period since the mid-1990s.
The contribution from the IT-producing industries moved up during
1995–2000 and back down during 2000–05, with the size of the swing
depending on which output measure one uses. That said, both output mea-
sures show that the IT-producing industries made relatively large contri-
butions to aggregate productivity growth throughout the sample period. For
example, using the value added ﬁgures, the four IT-producing industries
accounted for 19 percent (0.47 ÷ 2.52) of aggregate productivity growth
over 2000–05, far above their 4 percent share of value added.
Potential Explanations for the Industry Variation
We now explore two speciﬁc questions about the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of productivity growth. First, was the link between IT and produc-
tivity growth after 2000 as strong as in the second half of the 1990s? The
simple decompositions presented above suggest that it was not, but we
examine this more formally here. Second, is there evidence for the idea
that competition and restructuring contributed to the strong productivity
gains after 2000?
IT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH. This section examines the link between
industry-level productivity growth and IT intensity. The intuition is straight-
forward: if IT plays an important role in productivity growth through either
the direct capital deepening effect, a complementary but omitted input,
or productivity spillovers, one should expect the most IT-intensive indus-
tries to show the largest productivity gains. We estimate cross-sectional
regressions that relate the change in productivity growth over two periods
to IT intensity at the end of the ﬁrst period as
where ΔAL
.
P is the change in productivity growth between two periods (from
1988–95 to 1995–2000, from 1988–95 to 1995–2005, or from 1995–2000
to 2000–05).
We use two alternative measures of IT intensity. The ﬁrst is a qualita-
tive indicator of relative intensity: a dummy variable equal to one if the IT
share of total nonresidential capital income exceeds the industry median
() , 21 ΔALP IT ii i   =+ + αβ ε
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and zero otherwise.66 This qualitative approach allows a broad interpretation
of IT as a proxy for related investments such as intangible capital and the
improved management practices that typically accompany IT. Moreover,
this type of indicator variable is robust to the type of measurement error
in the capital stock described by Randy Becker and coauthors,
67 but it
misses the variation in IT intensity across industries. Our second measure
is the actual share of IT capital services in total nonresidential capital ser-
vices. This quantitative measure better captures differences in IT intensity
but is more prone to measurement error. We estimate the IT share regres-
sions with data from all sixty industries and from ﬁfty-six industries after
dropping the four IT-producing industries; the latter sample removes
some outliers and focuses on the impact of the use of IT.
We deﬁne IT intensity as that just before the period of acceleration, for
example in 1995 when analyzing the change in productivity growth after
1995, and in 2000 when examining the change after 2000. Although this
procedure is not perfect, it helps control for the endogeneity of investment.
In the dummy variable speciﬁcation, β represents the change in productivity
growth across periods for IT-intensive industries relative to the change for
other industries; in the quantitative speciﬁcation, β represents the increase in
the change of productivity growth associated with a marginal increase in IT
intensity.
Table 7 presents the results. The ﬁrst three columns examine changes
in the second half of the 1990s by comparing 1995–2000 with 1988–95.
The middle three columns extend the data to 2005 but keep the breakpoint
and the measure of IT intensity at 1995. The ﬁnal three columns focus on
the post-2000 gains by comparing the change in productivity from 2000 to
2005 with that from 1995 to 2000. The top panel uses gross output as the
output measure, and the bottom panel uses value added. All estimates
use ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors.
68
66. This speciﬁcation is identical to a difference-in-difference-style regression with a
post-1995 or post-2000 dummy variable, an IT intensity dummy, and the interaction esti-
mated with annual data for the full period.
67. Becker and others (2005).
68. We also estimated (but do not report) weighted least squares estimates, which are
appropriate if the somewhat arbitrary nature of the industry classiﬁcation system makes
measurement error more severe in the relatively small industries. See Kahn and Lim (1998)
for a more detailed discussion of weights in industry regressions. These weighted estimates
are similar to those reported in table 7.
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The estimates through 2000 suggest a link between IT intensity and the
change in productivity growth using the gross output data, but the results
are weaker using the value-added data. When we extend the data to include
the post-2000 period and compare 1995–2005 with 1988–95, both sets of
estimates show large and signiﬁcant IT effects. The ﬁnal three columns
indicate that IT intensity in 2000 is not a useful predictor of the change in
productivity growth after 2000.
69
These results show that the most IT-intensive industries in 1995 expe-
rienced larger increases in productivity growth after 1995 and that these
gains lasted through 2005. Although the IT intensity variable explains
only a relatively small portion of the overall variation across industries,
the size of the IT effect is economically large: IT-intensive industries
showed an increase in productivity growth that was between 1.5 and 2.0
percentage points greater than in other industries when 1995–2005 is
compared with 1988–95. Despite data revisions and the shift to NAICS,
the results are similar to those in earlier work, indicating strong support
for the view that IT use mattered for the productivity gains after 1995.
Of course, to the extent that IT capital is correlated with other factors
such as management skills or intangible capital, these gains should be
attributed to the whole suite of business activities that accompany IT
investment, and not narrowly to changes in physical capital.
By contrast, the post-2000 acceleration in productivity does not appear
to be tied to the accumulation of IT assets in the late 1990s. In particular,
we ﬁnd no evidence that industries that sowed lots of IT capital in the late
1990s reaped a particularly large productivity payoff after 2000. Although
these results are surely confounded by cyclical dynamics that were espe-
cially severe in the high-technology sectors, analysis of an earlier vintage of
the industry data by Stiroh shows that the reduced correlation between IT
and productivity is not due solely to the high-technology slowdown in 2001.
70
COMPETITIVE PRESSURES AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH. One idea that
has received considerable attention is that U.S. ﬁrms may have been under
increased pressure in the 2000s to cut costs and raise efﬁciency in order to
69. Stiroh and Botsch (2007) report similar results.
70. Stiroh (2006). These results could be consistent with an IT-based explanation if the
pervasiveness of IT makes it difﬁcult to identify a link econometrically. That is, if IT is
integral for all industries, then measures of IT intensity may not be useful for classiﬁcation
purposes. This view, however, is inherently untestable.
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maintain proﬁtability in a more globalized and competitive environment.71
Robert Gordon, for example, concludes that the “savage cost cutting and
layoffs” that followed the profit boom of the late 1990s likely explain
the unusual surge of productivity in the early 2000s.
72 Mark Schweitzer
notes that managers have stressed the need to realign business processes
without hiring additional workers, although he admits that empirical sup-
port is limited.
73 Erica Groshen and Simon Potter raise the possibility that
new management strategies promoted lean staffing in order to increase
efﬁciency.
74 Firms may have been better able to carry out these strategies
in an environment of more flexible and efficient labor markets.
75
If the cost-cutting hypothesis is true, productivity growth should have
been relatively strong and hours growth relatively weak after 2000 in those
industries that experienced the biggest decline in proﬁt in earlier years
and thus were under the most intense pressure to restructure. To identify
those industries, we examine the change in the proﬁt share derived from
the BEA industry data, where the proﬁt share is deﬁned as gross operating
surplus (consumption of ﬁxed capital; business transfers; other gross operat-
ing surplus such as proﬁts before tax; net interest; and miscellaneous pay-
ments) as a share of value added. Although one might want to remove the
consumption of ﬁxed capital and the normal return to capital, those data
are not available at a detailed level. Our proﬁt share measure should be
viewed as a broad measure that includes the gross return to capital.
We then compared industry growth from 2001 to 2004—the period of
extremely rapid aggregate productivity gains—with changes in industry-
level proﬁt shares from the 1997 peak in the aggregate proﬁt share to the
2001 trough. As a ﬁrst pass, ﬁgures 2 and 3 plot the growth of hours and
labor productivity from 2001 to 2004 against the change in the profit
share from 1997 to 2001 for sixty industries. These scatterplots offer some
support for the restructuring hypothesis, as a decline in the proﬁt share is
71. Baily (2004) discusses the case study evidence of the impact of competitive intensity
on ﬁrms’ need to innovate and increase productivity and argues that competitive pressure
gradually increased during the 1970s and 1980s.
72. Gordon (2003, p. 274). See Nordhaus (2002a) for details on proﬁt trends over this
period.
73. Schweitzer (2004).
74. Groshen and Potter (2003).
75. This has been documented by Schreft and Singh (2003) and by Aaronson, Rissman,
and Sullivan (2004).
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Source: Authors’ calculations using BLS and BEA data.
a. Each point is one of sixty industry observations; line plots fitted values from an OLS regression.
b. Average annual rate of growth in hours worked from 2001 to 2004.
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and electronics
Source: Authors’ calculations using BLS and BEA data.
a. Each point is one of sixty industry observations. Line plots fitted values from an OLS regression.
b. Average annual rate of growth of labor productivity from 2001 to 2004 based on gross output.
c. Change in the ratio of gross operating surplus to value added from 1997 to 2001.
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Figure 2. Hours Growth over 2001–04 versus Change in the Proﬁt Share 
over 1997–2001, by Industry
a
Figure 3. Labor Productivity Growth over 2001–04 versus Change in 
the Proﬁt Share over 1997–2001, by Industry
a
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associated  (signiﬁcantly) with slower hours growth and faster ALP
growth.
76 To gauge the magnitude of this effect, note that industries with
below-median changes in the proﬁt share experienced hours growth 2 per-
centage points slower on average than did other industries and labor pro-
ductivity growth about 3 percentage points faster.
77
We also estimate cross-sectional regressions that relate growth in the
early 2000s to the lagged change in the proﬁt share as
where X
.
is average annual growth of either hours, intermediate inputs,
labor productivity, or output from 2001 to 2004, ΔPR is the change in the
proﬁt share from 1997 to 2001, and Z are controls. Equation 22 is obvi-
ously a reduced-form regression, and the controls are therefore intended
to soak up variation attributable to other factors. Z includes the contem-
poraneous change in the proﬁt share from 2001 to 2004, to control for
demand effects; lagged growth in the dependent variable from 1997 to
2001, to control for longer-run trends (for example, the possibility that
some industries may be in secular decline); and the IT capital service
share, to control for IT intensity. Finally, we interacted the IT capital ser-
vice share with the lagged change in the proﬁt share, to examine whether
IT intensity facilitated adjustment to competitive pressures.
Table 8 reports estimates of equation 22 without and with these controls.
The top panel uses input growth (either hours or intermediate inputs) as
the dependent variable, the middle panel uses labor productivity measures
based on gross output or value added, and the bottom panel uses the two
output measures. All estimates use OLS with robust standard errors.
The hours growth regressions reveal a strong positive link, as industries
with large declines in the profit share over 1997–2001 experienced sig-
nificantly slower hours growth from 2001 to 2004. There is no similar link
with intermediate inputs. Firms might have been expected to economize on
all margins, but differences in adjustment costs could explain the different
() , 22   XP R ii i i =+ + + αβ γ ε Δ Z
76. The signiﬁcance of the cross-sectional correlation is robust to dropping the two
major outliers—computers and electronics, and information and data systems—on the far
left of ﬁgures 2 and 3.
77. t-tests for differences in the mean growth rates between the two groups of indus-
tries reject the hypothesis that the two had equal growth rates for hours and productivity,
but fail to reject the hypothesis that the two had equal output growth rates.
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results for hours and intermediate inputs. The results in the middle panel
show a strong negative link between the lagged change in the proﬁt share
and productivity growth. Finally, the bottom panel reports some evidence
that output growth was faster in the industries with a declining proﬁt share,
but the link is weaker and far less robust than that between labor productiv-
ity and the proﬁt share.
78
These results support the hypothesis that competitive pressure and restruc-
turing help explain the post-2000 productivity gains. One interpretation is
that ﬁrms in those industries where proﬁts fell most dramatically through
2001 became cautious, hired fewer workers, and improved productivity and
efﬁciency after 2001. Moreover, the absence of strongly signiﬁcant effects
in the output regressions, together with the robustness of the results to the
inclusion of the contemporaneous change in the proﬁt share, suggests that
this was not just a demand story, but rather reﬂects how ﬁrms chose to
produce a given amount of output. Similarly, the results are robust to
including a lagged dependent variable, and so it does not appear that we
are merely capturing long-run trends. Finally, these estimates provide
additional evidence that IT was not a driving factor in the early 2000s, as
both the level of IT intensity and the interaction term are insigniﬁcant in
all except the hours regressions.
Productivity Trends and Outlook
This section turns to the outlook for productivity growth. After high-
lighting issues with the recent data, we report long-period averages of labor
productivity growth to provide a benchmark for assessing the strength of
recent growth. We also present trend estimates from a Kalman ﬁlter model
and estimates of the steady-state growth implicit in our aggregate growth
78. As a robustness check, we estimated difference-in-difference regressions and found
that industries with a below-median change in the profit share from 1997 to 2001 had a
bigger decline in the growth of hours and a bigger increase in the growth of gross output
labor productivity than did other industries. No signiﬁcant difference emerged for value-
added labor productivity growth. We also ran regressions with more detailed measures of
intermediate inputs, including energy, materials, and purchased service inputs, as the depen-
dent variable, but those results were uniformly insigniﬁcant and are not reported. As a sec-
ond robustness check, we compared hours, productivity, and output growth for 1992 with
the change in the proﬁt share from 1989 to 1991 and found largely insigniﬁcant results, sug-
gesting that the latest cyclical episode was different from the previous one.
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accounting model. Finally, we compare these trend estimates with those
reported by other analysts.
What Do the Recent Data Say?
Assessing the underlying trend in labor productivity growth since 2000
has been complicated by major data revisions to both output and hours
worked and by swings in actual productivity growth. Table 9 displays both
dimensions of the recent data. Moving down a column in the table shows
the effect of revisions across successive vintages of data, while moving
across a line shows the effect of adding additional years to the period
covered by the data.
79
For 2000–03, the average growth of labor productivity was reported
initially in March 2004 to have been 3.8 percent. This surprisingly robust
gain led many analysts to ask why labor productivity growth had acceler-
ated further despite sluggish investment spending, the 2001 recession, and
other adverse shocks. However, subsequent revisions reduced the rate of
79. The ﬁgures in table 9 are calculated from BLS’s quarterly Productivity and Costs
data. The deﬁnition of nonfarm business in these data includes government enterprises. In
contrast, the deﬁnition of nonfarm business in BLS’s MFP data, the data we use to calculate
the labor productivity growth rates in table 1, excludes government enterprises. This slight
difference in sectoral coverage explains why labor productivity growth for 2000–06 differs
by 0.1 percentage point across the two tables. The same explanation accounts for the slight
difference in the average growth rate for 1973–95 between table 1 and the column for non-
farm business in table 10 below.
Table 9. Effects of Data Revisions and Data for Additional Years on Measured
Growth of Labor Productivity
a
Period covered by the data
Vintage of data 1995–2000 2000–03 2000–04 2000–05 2000–06
March 2004 2.4 3.8
August 2004 2.5 3.7
March 2005 2.5 3.7 3.7
August 2005 2.5 3.4 3.4
March 2006 2.5 3.4 3.4 3.3
August 2006 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.1
March 2007 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.8
Source: Authors’ calculations using BLS data.
a. Measured as 100 times the average log difference over the indicated period, based on annual average data.
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advance to 3.4 percent.
80 The initial estimates for 2000–04 and 2000–05
were revised downward in a similar fashion, tempering some of the earlier
optimism about the underlying trend. In addition to these revisions, smaller
gains in labor productivity over the past few years have brought down the
average growth rate, reported in the bottom line of the table. In the current
vintage of data (March 2007), growth over 2000–06 averaged 2.8 percent,
a full percentage point below the initial reading for the ﬁrst three years of
this period.
Long-Period Averages
Long-period averages of labor productivity growth provide one way to
put the recent ﬁgures into perspective. The ﬁrst column of table 10, using
data from BLS, shows productivity growth rates over several periods ex-
tending back to 1909. These data cover a broader sector of the economy
than nonfarm business and so do not line up perfectly with the estimates
presented earlier in the paper. That said, labor productivity growth accord-
ing to these ﬁgures has averaged 2.2 percent a year since 1909.
81 The sec-
ond column shows productivity growth rates over selected periods since
1950 for the nonfarm business sector; here growth averaged 2.7 percent a
80. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007) show that such revisions are not unusual; for
example, there was a steady stream of upward revisions to productivity growth in the
mid-1990s.
81. There are a number of alternative historical series for labor productivity. Although
they yield different results in some periods, the patterns of growth and long-run averages
are qualitatively similar to the BLS data presented here. For example, see Gordon (2006).
Table 10. Growth of Labor Productivity: Long-Period Averages
a










Source: Authors’ calculations using BLS data.
a. Measured as 100 times the average log difference over the indicated period based on annual average data.
b. Data before 1947 pertain to the private economy (deﬁned as gross national product less general government), whereas data
for 1947 and later years pertain to the business sector.
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year during 1995–2006, similar to that during the so-called “golden era”
of productivity from 1950 to 1973 and well above the postwar average
of 2.1 percent a year. Thus by historical standards the performance of
labor productivity since 1995 has been quite strong.
Kalman Filter Estimates
As one approach to obtaining time-varying estimates of the trend in labor
productivity, we use a slightly modiﬁed version of the Kalman ﬁlter model
developed by John Roberts.82 Although alternative implementations could
yield answers that differ from the one presented here, the Roberts model
has some appealing features.
83 In particular, it allows for shocks to both the
level and the growth rate of trend productivity, and it controls for cyclical
changes in productivity growth by assuming that hours adjust gradually to
output following a cyclical shock. We estimate the model by the maximum
likelihood method, using standard BLS data on labor productivity in the
nonfarm business sector from the ﬁrst quarter of 1953 to the fourth quarter
of 2006.
For the fourth quarter of 2006, this procedure estimates that the trend
in labor productivity growth was 2
1⁄4 percent a year, roughly 
1⁄2 percentage
point below the average pace of productivity growth since 2000. Put
another way, the model interprets some of the extraordinary growth in the
years immediately after the 2001 recession as transitory. The model also
delivers a 2-standard-error conﬁdence band around the estimated trend,
ranging from 1.3 percent to 3.2 percent. Thus considerable uncertainty
surrounds this estimate of trend productivity growth.
Steady-State Analysis of Labor Productivity Growth
As a complement to the Kalman ﬁlter estimate of the trend in labor pro-
ductivity growth, we calculate the growth rate that would prevail in the
steady state of our aggregate growth accounting model. For this exercise
we use the version of the model that excludes our added intangibles, so
82. In Roberts (2001) the Kalman ﬁlter is used to obtain time-varying estimates of
trend growth in both potential output and labor productivity. Our implementation ﬁrst uses
a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to estimate the trend in hours and then feeds this exogenous trend
to the model. Hence we need to estimate a trend only for labor productivity.
83. For other estimates of trend productivity using Kalman ﬁlter techniques, see Brainard
and Perry (2000) and Gordon (2003).
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that our estimates can be compared with those of other researchers. We
stress at the outset that we do not regard these steady-state results as fore-
casts of productivity growth over any period. Rather this exercise yields
“structured guesses” for growth in labor productivity consistent with alter-
native scenarios for certain key features of the economy.
The steady state in our model is characterized by the following condi-
tions. Real output in each sector grows at a constant rate (which can differ
across sectors), and real investment in each type of capital grows at the





type of capital, adjustment costs have no effect on MFP growth (sectoral
or aggregate) in the steady state. On the labor side, we require that hours
worked grow at the same constant rate in every sector, that the workweek
be ﬁxed, and that labor quality improve at a constant rate.
Under these conditions the steady-state growth rate of aggregate labor
productivity can be written as follows:
84
where the α’s denote income shares, the φ’s denote the adjustment cost
elasticity of output with respect to each type of capital, β
S
i is the share of
total costs in ﬁnal-output sector i represented by purchases of semicon-
ductors, q . is the rate of increase in labor quality, z .
i and z .
s denote the rates
of improvement in sectoral technology, and z . is the Domar share-weighted
sum of these sectoral rates of improvement. Recall that the z . terms (sectoral
or aggregate) equal the growth of MFP after controlling for the effects of
changes in factor utilization and adjustment costs. No explicit terms for
capital deepening appear in equation 23. However, capital deepening is
determined endogenously from the improvement in technology, and the
terms in brackets account for the growth contribution from this induced
capital deepening.
85








      =− ( ) + ( ) [] + ∑      αφ α β + +   z,
84. See the appendix to the working paper version of this paper (Oliner, Sichel, and
Stiroh, 2007) for details.
85. Even though adjustment costs have no direct effect on growth in the steady state,
the adjustment cost elasticities (φi) appear in the weights on the capital deepening terms in
equation 23, just as they did in the growth accounting equation that applies outside the steady
state (equation 1). As in that case, we lack the information to specify these asset-speciﬁc
elasticities. We proceed as we did before, by replacing the theoretically correct weights with
standard income-share weights that sum to the same value (one minus the labor share).
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The steady-state equation depends on a large number of parameters
(income shares, sectoral output shares, semiconductor cost shares, and so
on). We consider a range of parameter values.
86 For the most part, steady-
state growth is not very sensitive to these parameters individually. However,
the results do depend importantly on two parameters: the rate of improve-
ment in labor quality and the rate of advance in technology outside the
IT-producing sectors (“other nonfarm business”).
87 Following Jorgenson,
Ho, and Stiroh,
88 we assume that labor quality will improve by 0.15 per-
cent a year, well below the historical rate of increase, as the educational
attainment of new labor force entrants rises more slowly than in the past
and experienced workers reach retirement age. For the value of z . in other
nonfarm business, we consider values ranging from 0.19 to 0.98 percent a
year. The lower-bound ﬁgure equals the average annual growth of z . in
this sector over 1973–2000, which allows for reversion to the longer-term
average prevailing before the recent period of rapid gains. The upper-bound
ﬁgure equals the average annual increase over 2000–06, minus 
1⁄4 percentage
point to account for the likelihood that some of the advance during this
period was transitory.
Table 11 presents the results from the steady-state exercise using equa-
tion 23. The estimated range for steady-state labor productivity growth runs
from 1.46 percent at an annual rate to 3.09 percent. The wide range reﬂects
our uncertainty about the values of the parameters that determine steady-
state growth. The center of the range is 2
1⁄4 percent, about 
1⁄2 percentage
point below the average rate of labor productivity growth since 2000. This
step-down from the recent average largely reflects the assumption that
improvements in labor quality will slow and that gains in MFP, after con-
trolling for adjustment costs and factor utilization, will not be as robust as
the average pace since 2000.
Comparing Results
Table 12 compares the results from our steady-state and Kalman ﬁlter
analyseswithforecastsoflaborproductivitygrowthfromavarietyofsources.
All but three of these forecasts have a horizon of ten years. The other three
86. These are listed in the appendix to Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007).
87. For the IT-producing sectors, the rate of advance in technology is determined
endogenously from the assumed rates of change in prices for IT capital and a variety of
other parameters.
88. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007).
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have shorter horizons.89 These forecasts for average annual growth in labor
productivity range from 2 percent to 2.6 percent. As noted above, the mid-
point of our estimated range for steady-state growth and the estimated trend
from the Kalman ﬁlter are both 2
1⁄4 percent, near the center of the range of
these forecasts. Thus there seems to be considerable agreement that labor pro-
ductivity growth will remain reasonably strong over a medium-term horizon.
89. The horizon in Kahnand Rich (2006) is ﬁve years, that in Economic Report of the Presi-
dent 2007 is six years, and that in the March 2007 Macroeconomic Advisers report is eight years.
Table 11. Growth of Labor Productivity: Steady-State Results
a
Using lower-bound  Using upper-bound 
Item parameters parameters
Growth of labor productivity in the nonfarm  1.46 3.09
business sector (percent a year)
Contributions from (percentage points):
Induced capital deepening 0.75 1.39
Improvement in labor quality 0.15 0.15
Growth of MFP 0.56 1.55
Memorandum: MFP growth, other nonfarm  0.19 0.98
business (percent a year)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Calculated from equation 23 in the text. Values for the parameters that appear in equation 23 are listed in the appendix to
Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007).
Table 12. Alternative Estimates of Future Growth in Labor Productivity
Percent a year
Source Date of projection Estimate
This paper: steady-state analysis March 2007 1.5 to 3.1
This paper: Kalman ﬁlter analysis March 2007 1.3 to 3.2
Robert Gordon March 2007 2.0
Survey of Professional Forecastersa February 2007 2.2
Global Insight March 2007 2.2
Macroeconomic Advisers March 2007 2.2
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce January 2007 2.3
Dale Jorgenson, Mun Ho, and Kevin Stiroh
b October 2006 2.5
James Kahn and Robert Rich March 2007 2.5
Council of Economic Advisers January 2007 2.6
Sources: Gordon (2007, slide 24); Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional Forecasters, February 13, 2007;
Global Insight, U.S. Executive Summary, March 2007, p. 6; Macroeconomic Advisers, Macro Focus, March 22, 2007, p. 11; Congres-
sional Budget Ofﬁce (2007a, table 2-2); Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007, table 3); Kahn and Rich (2006), updated to March 2007
based on the productivity model update posted at www.newyorkfed.org/research/national_economy/richkahn_prodmod.pdf;
Economic Report of the President 2007, table 1-2.
a. Median of the thirty-eight forecasts in the survey.
b. “Base-case” projection.
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That said, one should be humble about this type of exercise, for a number
of reasons. First, both the Kalman ﬁlter and our steady-state machinery point
to a very wide conﬁdence band around the point estimates. Second, the data
on labor productivity through 2006 still could be revised signiﬁcantly. In the
future we might be looking at a picture of actual labor productivity growth
for recent years that is different from the one we see today. Finally, as a gen-
eral matter, economists do not have a stellar track record in forecasting
trends in labor productivity. Although we think the analysis here moves the
debate forward, we are acutely aware of the inherent limitations.
Conclusion
Productivity developments since 1995 have raised many important and
interesting questions for productivity analysts and policymakers, four of
which we address in this paper. First, given the data now available and the
various critiques of neoclassical growth accounting that have arisen in recent
years, is IT still a critical part of the story for the observed acceleration in
productivity growth over 1995–2000? Second, what is the source of the
continued strength in productivity growth since 2000? Third, how has the
accumulation of intangible capital inﬂuenced recent productivity develop-
ments? And, ﬁnally, based on our answers to these questions, what is the
outlook for productivity growth? We have used a variety of techniques to
address these questions, including aggregate growth accounting augmented
to incorporate variable utilization, adjustment costs, and intangible asset
accumulation; an assessment of industry-level productivity patterns; and
Kalman ﬁlter and steady-state analysis to gauge trend productivity.
Both the aggregate and the industry-level results conﬁrm the central
role of IT in the productivity revival during 1995–2000. IT also plays a
signiﬁcant role after 2000, although its impact appears smaller than it was
during 1995–2000. These results stand even after accounting for variable
factor utilization, adjustment costs, and intangible capital and so provide
strong support for the consensus view that IT was a key source of growth
for the U.S. economy over the past decade.
Our results suggest that the sources of the productivity gains since 2000
differ in important ways from those during 1995–2000. Along with the
smaller direct role for IT in the latest period, aggregate productivity growth
since 2000 appears to have been boosted by industry restructuring in response
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to proﬁt pressures and by a reallocation of material and labor inputs across
industries. We also ﬁnd considerable churning among industries, with
some industries showing accelerating productivity in the second half of
the 1990s and different ones accelerating in the most recent period.
Adding intangible capital to our aggregate growth accounting framework
changes the time proﬁle for productivity growth since 1995 relative to the
published data. The measure of intangible assets used in this paper implies
that the fastest gains in labor productivity occurred during 1995–2000, with
some step-down after 2000. In addition, the inclusion of intangibles tempers
the size of the pickup in MFP growth from 1995–2000 to 2000–06.
Finally, in terms of the productivity outlook, both the Kalman ﬁlter and
the steady-state analyses deliver broadly similar results and highlight the
wide range of uncertainty surrounding estimates of growth in trend labor
productivity. In both cases the central tendencies suggest a rate for trend
productivity gains of around 2
1⁄4 percent a year, a rate that is consistent
with productivity growth remaining well above the lackluster pace that
prevailed during the twenty-ﬁve years before 1995, but somewhat slower
than the 1995–2006 average.
APPENDIX A
Industry Data
Table A-1. Value Added, IT Share, and IT Classiﬁcation of U.S. Industries
Value added, 
IT classiﬁcation
2005 (millions  IT share, IT-





Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing,  123.1 1.4 0 0 0
and hunting
Oil and gas extraction 159.6 1.8 0 0 0
Mining, except oil and gas 31.5 6.0 0 0 0
Support activities for mining 42.2 8.9 0 0 0
Construction 611.1 19.0 1 1 0
Wood products 39.0 6.4 0 0 0
Nonmetallic mineral products 53.3 9.1 0 0 0
Primary metals 61.1 5.3 0 0 0
Fabricated metal products 130.5 9.3 0 0 0
Machinery 111.1 23.3 1 1 0
(continued)
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Table A-1. Value Added, IT Share, and IT Classiﬁcation of U.S. Industries (Continued)
Value added, 
IT classiﬁcation
2005 (millions  IT share, IT-
Name of dollars) 2005a IT1995
b IT2000
c producingd
Computer and electronic  135.3 23.4 1 1 1
products
Electrical equipment,  47.8 12.8 1 1 0
appliances, and components
Motor vehicles, bodies and  95.4 15.2 1 1 0
trailers, and parts
Other transportation equipment 71.1 28.4 1 1 0
Furniture and related products 37.1 9.6 0 0 0
Miscellaneous manufacturing 72.6 16.0 1 1 0
Food and beverage and  175.7 8.8 0 0 0
tobacco products
Textile mills and textile  23.8 4.0 0 0 0
product mills
Apparel and leather and allied  16.8 7.2 0 0 0
products
Paper products 54.6 6.5 0 0 0
Printing and related support  46.9 12.4 0 1 0
activities
Petroleum and coal products 63.5 9.4 0 0 0
Chemical products 209.2 17.1 1 1 0
Plastics and rubber products 67.7 5.6 0 0 0
Utilities 248.0 5.5 0 0 0
Wholesale trade 743.2 25.4 1 1 0
Retail trade 823.5 14.6 1 0 0
Air transportation 41.0 42.7 1 1 0
Rail transportation 32.3 2.0 0 0 0
Water transportation 9.0 42.3 1 1 0
Truck transportation 114.1 11.5 0 0 0
Transit and ground passenger  17.1 16.8 1 1 0
transportation
Pipeline transportation 9.3 27.6 1 1 0
Other transportation and  89.1 15.1 0 1 0
support activities
Warehousing and storage 32.7 19.0 0 0 0
Publishing industries  150.2 49.8 1 1 1
(includes software)
Motion picture and sound  40.5 16.5 1 1 0
recording industries
Broadcasting and  304.1 46.5 1 1 0
telecommunications
Information and data  60.4 81.7 1 1 1
processing services
(continued)
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Table A-1. Value Added, IT Share, and IT Classiﬁcation of U.S. Industries (Continued)
Value added, 
IT classiﬁcation
2005 (millions  IT share, IT-
Name of dollars) 2005a IT1995
b IT2000
c producingd
Federal Reserve banks, credit  474.7 28.6 1 1 0
intermediation, and related 
activities
Securities, commodity  167.4 51.8 1 1 0
contracts, and investments
Insurance carriers and related  296.1 38.9 1 1 0
activities
Funds, trusts, and other  19.5 6.6 0 0 0
ﬁnancial vehicles
Real estate 1,472.6 8.7 0 0 0
Rental and leasing services  105.8 23.1 1 1 0
and lessors of intangible 
assets
Legal services 180.9 47.7 1 1 0
Computer systems design  140.8 89.3 1 1 1
and related services
Miscellaneous professional,  542.5 67.5 1 1 0
scientiﬁc, and technical 
services
Management of companies  225.8 45.6 1 1 0
and enterprises
Administrative and support  336.6 45.5 1 1 0
services
Waste management and  32.3 6.2 0 0 0
remediation services
Educational services 115.8 22.1 0 1 0
Ambulatory health care  441.9 14.5 1 0 0
services
Hospitals and nursing and  342.2 13.1 1 0 0
residential care facilities
Social assistance 75.4 21.3 1 1 0
Performing arts, spectator  54.0 10.2 0 0 0
sports, museums, and 
related activities
Amusements, gambling, and  60.1 4.8 0 0 0
recreation industries
Accommodation 104.6 5.0 0 0 0
Food services and drinking  225.9 5.8 0 0 0
places
Other services, except  282.8 13.8 0 0 0
government
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BEA data.
a. Nominal value of IT capital services divided by nominal value of total nonresidential capital services.
b. Equals 1 if 1995 IT capital service share is greater than 1995 median, and zero otherwise.
c. Equals 1 if 2000 IT capital service share is greater than 2000 median, and zero otherwise.
d. As deﬁned by BEA.
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Comments and 
Discussion
Martin Neil Baily: The three authors of this paper have made some of the
strongest contributions to the productivity literature in recent years, and it
is terriﬁc to see them team up to provide an important new analysis of the
productivity acceleration that started in the mid-1990s. In particular, I
liked the creative way they have adapted the growth accounting frame-
work to take account of intangible capital, and I welcome the new insights
provided by their industry-level regression analysis, particularly those high-
lighting the role for competitive pressure.
Labor productivity accelerated in the United States starting in 1996,
after over twenty years of slow growth. That acceleration has been widely
attributed to the revolution in information technology, a natural enough
inference given that the acceleration coincided with a wave of capital
investment in IT hardware and software. Indeed, some fraction of the pro-
ductivity acceleration can certainly be attributed directly to an acceleration
within the IT hardware-producing sector. Around 2000–01, however, the
IT bubble burst, and IT investment slumped as the economy went into a
mild recession. Yet, surprisingly, productivity growth did not slow down
but actually grew even faster over 2002–04. This meant that the simple cor-
relation between IT investment and productivity broke down after 2000.
There are three possible responses to what happened. The ﬁrst is to con-
clude that perhaps IT was not as important to the post-1995 productivity
acceleration as had been thought. Second, one could argue that IT invest-
ment has a lagged effect on productivity, so that the high-technology
investment boom in the late 1990s had an impact that spilled over into the
post-2000 period. A third hypothesis is that IT investment creates intangible
capital that should be counted as part of total output. This last option is the
approach taken in the growth accounting section of this paper, and it shifts
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1. Corrado. Hulten, and Sichel (2006).
2. Basu and others (2004).
3. Basu and others (2004, p. 52)
some of the productivity acceleration from the post-2000 period backward
in time to 1995–2000, where it coincides with the surge in IT investment.
Working only with aggregate productivity data, one has very limited
information available to identify which (if any) of these three options is
correct. Indeed, on the productivity side, there are really only three obser-
vations to work with: slow growth until 1995, faster growth after 1995, and
even faster growth after 2000. Meanwhile much of the accumulation in
intangible capital is very difﬁcult to observe. The paper by Corrado, Hulten,
and Sichel discussed by the authors develops measures of intangible capi-
tal based on a variety of data sources and includes software investment,
company training, consulting, and the labor input of employees in job
categories that contribute to organizational capital.
1 The estimates from
this work were not available beyond 2003, and so the present authors do
a quick update through 2005. They report, in their table 3, that intangible
capital accumulation by this measure turned down sharply after 2000.
In this paper the authors do not use the Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel esti-
mates directly but turn instead to the paper by Basu and others to develop
their new approach to growth accounting.
2 Basu and others is an interest-
ing and helpful paper, but I am not persuaded that their approach is a real
substitute for direct observation of intangibles. The basic assumption is
that intangible capital investment is tied very closely to investment in IT
hardware, so that the time-series pattern of the former is derived from that
of the latter. It is entirely plausible that high investment in IT demands an
increase in intangible investment, but whether or not this is the dynamic
driving the observed pattern of productivity growth remains unknown. 
I note also that the Basu and others paper has a mixed record in tracking
productivity trends. They do ﬁnd regression coefﬁcients for the United
States that suggest that heavy IT investment can depress measured produc-
tivity contemporaneously. But as they themselves note, “For the United
Kingdom, the same regression shows little. Almost nothing is statistically
signiﬁcant, and the signs are reversed from what theory suggested.”
3
The growth accounting section of the present paper takes a perfectly
sensible approach. The authors observe a puzzle and then construct an ana-
lytical framework that explains the puzzle in a manner consistent with
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established theory and methods. They then check the consistency of their
inferred measure of intangible capital with the Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel
approach, which relies more on direct measurement. My own view, how-
ever, is that this section of the paper relies too heavily on an IT-related
explanation of productivity without addressing the restructuring issue that
is supported by the industry section of this paper.
The industry analysis adds an important additional source of informa-
tion to the story, but this section of the paper is not well integrated with the
growth accounting section. There is no effort to measure intangible capital
investment by industry or to link such investment directly with the relative
productivity performances of the different industries. The authors make
the general observation that the role of IT capital is explored in a way that
is consistent with the ﬁrst half of the paper. However, the industry analysis
draws inferences from the timing of productivity acceleration that would
presumably change quite a bit if the intangible capital approach were used.
An immediate impression from the industry results is that there is a lot
of noise in the industry growth rates. The productivity estimates based on
value added differ substantially from the estimates based on gross output.
The results reported in the second panel of table 5 suggest regression to
the mean, as eleven industries show a reversal in sign (an industry with an
acceleration of productivity after 1995 slows after 2000, or vice versa).
Having worked with both industry and establishment data myself, I sym-
pathize with the authors as they face this problem, but this analysis makes
heavy demands on the data by drawing lessons not from productivity lev-
els or growth rates but from accelerations or decelerations. In part the
problem may be that price and quantity information in the United States is
much better for ﬁnal goods than for intermediate goods. This problem,
which is one that Edward Denison emphasized,
4 has been alleviated by
recent improvements in the data, but not eliminated.
A key result the authors are looking for is whether or not the pattern of
productivity acceleration by industry is consistent with an important role
for IT investment. In earlier work, Kevin Stiroh reported a strong link
between industries that had a high share of IT capital input in total capital
input in 1995 and the extent to which their productivity accelerated during
1995–2000.
5 This result remains valid here, but the same approach for the
4. See Denison (1989).
5. Stiroh (2002b).
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post-2000 period does not work. As the authors note, “By contrast, the
post-2000 acceleration in productivity does not appear to be tied to the
accumulation of IT assets in the late 1990s.”
Thus the breakdown in the correlation between IT capital and produc-
tivity growth that I noted earlier for the aggregate time-series data also
extends to evidence from the industry-level analysis. The same result is
stated even more strongly by Bosworth and Triplett.
6 They report an asser-
tion in a recent survey of the literature that there is a consensus among
economists that the U.S. productivity acceleration was the result of inno-
vations in semiconductor manufacturing. Bosworth and Triplett respond,
on the basis of their own industry-level research, that “If this is indeed the
[economists’] consensus, we contend it is wrong.”
7 No one doubts that IT
has been an important enabling innovation, but it is not the whole story.
Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh point to the intense restructuring pressure that
occurred after 2000 as a key contributor to growth in productivity, and I
agree with this, as I said earlier. We know that in 2001–03 total hours
worked in the nonfarm business sector declined quite sharply while output
and productivity were both strong. This differs from the traditional pattern
of cyclical productivity where employment declines are associated with
weak productivity growth. Companies faced intense pressure to improve
profits in the wake of the technology bust and the accounting scandals of
the period. They reduced employment, kept investment low, and found
ways to cut costs. The authors test this hypothesis by showing that the
industries that had faced proﬁt pressure before 2000 were the ones that saw
the greatest improvement of productivity after 2001. Given the noisiness
of the data, there is a case for caution in interpreting these results, but over-
all I found them interesting.
In 2005 and 2006 labor productivity growth in the nonfarm business sec-
tor was 2.1 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively, well below the pace of the
recent past and even below the 2.5 percent a year trend of the late 1990s. Is
the productivity boom over? The ﬁnal section of this paper offers a look at
the future, and the authors use the John Roberts smoothing model as a basis
for estimating the productivity growth trend. They conclude that the trend is
now 2
1⁄4 percent a year—a more optimistic ﬁgure than some, but slower than
the 2000–05 rate. I am a little more optimistic (my estimate of the trend is
6. Bosworth and Triplett (2007).
7. Bosworth and Triplett (2007, p. 17).
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1⁄2 percent),8 and I am not comfortable with the Kalman ﬁlter approach to
ﬁguring it out. The smoothing algorithms became much too optimistic
about the trend in 2002–04 and are turning too pessimistic now. U.S. labor
productivity has the property that trend growth remains stable for extended
periods and then changes abruptly: generally strong growth in 1947–73 was
followed by generally weak growth in 1973–95, which was followed in turn
by generally strong growth in 1995–2006. It is hard to see why this would
be the case, but empirically it is hard to mistake. The trend accelerated after
1995 to 2.5 percent a year, and the corporate restructuring discussed in this
paper induced temporarily above-trend growth. It was to be expected that a
period of slower-than-trend growth would follow, and that is what we are
seeing now. It is certainly possible that the productivity boom has ended.
But it is the strong competitive intensity in the U.S. economy, combined
with technological opportunities and rapid globalization, that has driven
faster productivity growth in the past ten years. Their effects are likely to
continue a while longer.
N. Gregory Mankiw: I enjoyed the opportunity to read and reﬂect on this
paper by Stephen Oliner, Daniel Sichel, and Kevin Stiroh. I am an outsider
to the vast literature on growth accounting, and this paper does a good job
of bringing the reader up to date on the current state of play. I want to
begin by reﬂecting on the broader literature before turning to the results in
this paper that I found most intriguing.
To be honest, in my own life as a practical macroeconomist, I do not
spend a lot of time thinking about growth accounting. In fact, I can esti-
mate with a fair degree of precision that I spend ﬁfteen minutes a year on
the activity. Those are the ﬁfteen minutes that I teach growth accounting
to undergraduate students in my macroeconomics course. I write down a
production function, explain how Robert Solow taught us to compute his
famous residual, and then show some representative calculations for the
U.S. economy. I explain that this residual might be interpreted as a mea-
sure of the rate of technological progress, but I then explain how it might
reﬂect other phenomena as well, especially over the short time spans that
characterize the business cycle. Having done all this, I then ignore growth
142 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
8. Baily and Kirkegaard (2007).
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accounting for approximately the next 364 days (365 days in leap years)
until it is time to give the same spiel to the next cohort of undergraduates.
While reading this paper I found myself reﬂecting on my almost com-
plete lack of attention to the growth accounting literature, to which this
paper very ably contributes. My guess is that my experience is not all that
atypical. There is a small and hardworking band of brothers (and sisters),
including Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh, toiling in the ﬁelds of growth account-
ing. But most macroeconomists, like me, do not spend a lot of time focus-
ing on the results that this literature produces.
One reason is that this literature seems mired in a host of issues that
quickly make a reader’s eyes glaze over. Some of these issues are techni-
cal, such as distinctions between gross output and value added and the
index number theory that bridges that gap. Others involve data availability,
such as the potentially important role of unmeasured intangible capital.
Out of necessity, many of these issues get resolved by imposing assump-
tions on the production process which, although not outlandish, are neither
compelling nor verifiable. This paper, for example, at times makes an
assumption about the complementarity between information technology
and intangible capital that seems to be just pulled out of a hat.
But I think there is a more fundamental reason why the growth account-
ing literature fails to have a larger impact. Even if one grits one’s teeth
to make it through all the technical issues, and even if one has enough
credulity to buy into all the necessary assumptions, the exercise does not
deliver what we really want. Ultimately, God put macroeconomists on
earth for two reasons: forecasting and policy analysis. We want to know
how the world is likely to look in the future, and we want to know how
alternative policies would change the future course of history. Unfortu-
nately, growth accounting contributes relatively little to either forecasting
or policy analysis. Instead it is a deeply data-intensive exercise that often
gets so deeply enmeshed in its own internal logic that it never returns to the
big questions of macroeconomics.
Long ago, some economist—I believe it was Moses Abramovitz—
called multifactor productivity “a measure of our ignorance.” That is, we
account for changes in capital, labor, labor quality, and the many other
determinants of output we can measure, and the changes in output left
unexplained are called “multifactor productivity.” But that is really just
giving a fancy name to something about which we are pretty clueless.
When reading this paper I started playing a game where every time I read
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the authors say something about “multifactor productivity,” I imagined
putting some version of “a measure of our ignorance” in its place.
Let me give an example. At one point the authors write, “MFP growth
strengthened in the rest of nonfarm business, adding roughly 
3⁄4 percent-
age point to annual labor productivity growth during 2000–06 from its
1995–2000 average.” I rewrote the sentence as follows: “our ignorance
strengthened in the rest of nonfarm business, adding roughly 
3⁄4 percent-
age point to annual labor productivity growth during 2000–06 from its
1995–2000 average.” Framed in this alternative way, the statement carries
an almost comical hollowness. It also makes it clear why statements about
multifactor productivity are of limited use for either forecasting or policy
analysis. Measured ignorance is probably better than unmeasured igno-
rance, but it would be a mistake to confuse it for real knowledge.
The section of this paper I like best is the one that departs most from the
standard growth accounting paradigm and instead performs regression
analysis on a cross section of industries. The most striking result is illus-
trated in the paper’s ﬁgure 3 and conﬁrmed in regressions in table 8. Indus-
tries that experienced declining proﬁt from 1997 to 2001 had more rapid
productivity growth from 2001 to 2004. This fact is, on its face, consistent
with some of the stories popular in the press that increased competitive
pressure forced companies to restructure and increase productivity. As a
matter of theory, of course, the story is not very complete, as it fails to
explain why industries were once content to operate unproductively. But at
the very least, the cross-sectional correlation is sufﬁciently strong and
intriguing that it is worthy of further attention in both empirical and theo-
retical work.
In closing, let me note that the authors have done a vast amount of work
here. They have brought to bear a large quantity of data, applying tools that
are state-of-the-art within this literature. But when one is working with so
much data, it is easy to lose the forest among the trees. This paper presents
an impressively large number of trees. What I am less conﬁdent about is
whether the literature on growth accounting adds up to an equally impres-
sive forest.
General discussion: Robert Gordon agreed with the discussants that the
link between investment in information technology and the acceleration
of productivity is much weaker after 2000 than in the late 1990s. He com-
pared the paper’s analysis of developments after 2000 with that in his own
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2003 Brookings Paper, which was based on quarterly data through the
middle of that year. Both papers found that the lag of hours behind output
was important to understanding the initial postrecession surge in produc-
tivity. However, Gordon noted that the quarterly data show a sharp slow-
down in productivity in the second half of 2004, which the authors do not
explore using their annual data.
Gordon applauded the paper’s impressive empirical support for the
idea that profit pressures led to unusual cost-cutting efforts after 2000.
And he welcomed the attempt to model formally how IT beneﬁts might
have had important delayed effects on productivity. However, he ques-
tioned the authors’ assumption that variations in capacity utilization are
proportional to hours worked per employee. The standard counterexam-
ple to this assumption is the factory that is operating two assembly lines
before the economy goes into recession. The factory chooses to shut down
one assembly line, laying off half the workers, so that capacity utilization
drops by half, while hours per remaining employee remain unchanged.
Stephen Oliner replied that scope for such adjustments exists in only a
few industries and that a strong aggregate cyclical relationship can be
demonstrated between the work week and output growth.
Richard Cooper pointed out that two of the outliers in the authors’ ﬁg-
ure 3 are important IT sectors and conjectured that they importantly inﬂu-
ence the precision of the regression results. He suggested that using the
information available by sector could inform the analysis of the post-2000
productivity increase. For example, it is known that it was not mainly
competitive pressure, but rather technological advances, that pushed up
labor productivity growth in these two IT sectors. George Perry suggested
that the paper’s results may be sensitive to the choice of 2000 as the
breakpoint. In particular, for the value-added calculations, the behavior of
imports of intermediate goods appears very sensitive to that choice. William
Brainard remarked that the correlation between industry productivity and
proﬁts in the early 2000s could reﬂect costs of employment adjustment
rather than unusual pressures to improve proﬁts. Because such costs lead
employers to smooth employment ﬂuctuations, output increases much
faster than employment during a recovery, and this produces correspond-
ing changes in productivity and proﬁts.
Benjamin Friedman replied to Gregory Mankiw’s comment regarding
the usefulness of growth accounting. He noted that, a few years back, pro-
ductivity in the core European countries had been catching up to that in the
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United States, but in more recent years the gap has widened again. Through
the work of Dale Jorgenson and others, growth accounting has provided an
explanation of this closing and reopening of productivity differentials.
Eswar Prasad noted that, according to the authors’ appendix table A-1, the
retail trade sector’s share of IT capital services falls from above the median
in 1995 to below the median in 2000. This seems at odds with the stylized
fact that large retailers such as Wal-Mart, where technology adoption is
very important, are taking over from small mom-and-pop stores, where IT
has a much more limited role. This changing composition within retailing
should result in a growing rather than declining role for IT in this industry.
Kevin Stiroh replied that the IT use indicators are relative, and the data are
not inconsistent with the trends Prasad cited. The results do not show that
IT became less important in retailing, but only that the rest of the economy
was catching up with retailing.
Peter Henry asked the authors for their projection of multifactor produc-
tivity. Oliner replied that their forecast of annual labor productivity growth
of 2
1⁄4 percent is consistent with a growth rate of multifactor productivity of
approximately 1 percent, with the rest coming from improvements in labor
quality, which are assumed to be small, and capital deepening.
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